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The purpose of this thesis is to examine the relationship between Congress and the 
Department of Defense (DOD) with respect to Multiyear Procurement (MYP) within the 1990's 
environment of decreasing fiscal budgets. Sub-issues include analysis ofMYP cancellation risk, 
levels of Congressional control over the DOD MYP process and the Congressional MYP 
approvallrej ection decisions. 
The data for this research were gathered through a literature review on the internet, 
LEXISINEXIS, and various libraries. Interviews were conducted with personnel on the 
Secretary of Defense staff, 'Senate ~ed Services Committee Staff and numerous DOD 
program offices. 
This thesis concludes that multiyear cancellation risk is not as high as it is generally 
perceived. It also concludes that MYP legislation has ·not fully evolved consistent with recent 
acquisition reform initiatives. The final conclusion is that Congress' rationale for MYP 
approval/rejection is often not clear. Finally this thesis presents two recommendations to 
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The 1990s fiscal environment of the DOD can be characterized by the phrase "doing 
more with le'ss". Decreasing real funding levels combined with consistently high operational , 
commitments has lead DOD, and much of the rest of Government, to seek innovative methods to 
achieve high level performance with decreasing resources. This is the basis for acquisition 
reform. Increased use of mUltiyear procurement (MYP) is often offered as a II.1ethod to 
accomplish this goal and increase the efficiency of Government procurement. 
There are several tradeoffs that must be evaluated when considering MYP. Proponent 
highlights include program stability and reduced administrative burden. Both of these factors ' 
lead to increased efficiency and thus reduced costs for both the contractor and the Government. 
There are also risks associated with multiyear requirements. If the Government decides it wants 
to cancel a program, potential cancellation charges can be quite expensive. Secondly, MYPs 
reduce the amount of flexibility of all players in the budget process from Congress and the 
President down to the individual component services. This is especially important in an 
environment of shrinking budgets. If a budget is decreased, and some programs are in mUltiyear 
contracts, it is cost prohibitive to modify or cancel that program. Acquisition officials face great 
pressures not to cancel existing MYPs due to potential payment of cancellation fees, even though 
cancellation or reduction may make the most sense due to changing threats and requirements. 
Therefore, budgeting flexibility may be decreased. Thus, tradeoffs must be made between the 
advantages of stability and efficiency, versus the disadvantages of lost flexibility and 
cancellation charge risk. These tradeoffs are well documented in prior research. 
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Congress has an interesting relationship with the DOD. On one hand, Congress passes 
legislation that directs the basic operations of the military. From this perspective, Congress 
strives to make the military as effective and efficient as possible. Congress has the responsibility 
to control and protect the public funds and ensure they are spent properly. On the other hand, 
individual Congressmen have the responsibility to look out for the interests of their own districts. 
This often includes steering DOD programs and their associated jobs and money into their 
districts. Additionally, Congressmen must also seek reelection every two years in the House of 
Representatives and every six years in the Senate. If they allow too many MYPs to be approved, 
they will lose some of the ability to bring jobs to their districts on an annual basis. This will 
make it harder for Congressmen to demonstrate to their voters that they are doing good things for 
them and that they are deserving of their vote. The conflicting dynamics that Congress faces 
may have an impact on MYP policy and subsequent approval decisions. 
The public's call for acquisition reform within our Government is one that permeates our 
society. Pressure exists throughout Government to take on the basic premises of acquisition 
reform. Streamlining, improving efficiency, increased insight, decreased oversight and 
empowering decision makers with the authority to use their judgment to make smart decisions 
are only a few of the basic themes of acquisition reform. 
B. OBJECTIVE OF STUDY 
The object of this research is to examine the relationship between Congress and DOD 
with respect to MYP within the 1990s environment of decreasing DOD budgets. This 
environment has spurred increased focus on acquisition reform. This thesis analyzes the 
historical record and determines whether MYP programs have functioned in compliance with 
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Congress' directives. It concludes by exploring opportunities for additional acquisition reform 
initiatives for MYP. 
C.SCOPE 
This research focuses on the DOD MYP approval process. It analyzes the historical 
record of DOD MYP requests, and the Congressional approval/disapproval results for those 
requests. The MYP process is analyzed to determine if it has evolved consistently with 
acquisition reform directives and trends of the 1990s. This thesis does not analyze political 
motives or financial issue~ associated with MYP such as full funding, composition of 
cancellation ceilings and funded termination liabilities. 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary research question is, "What role does Congress play with respect to DOD 
MYP policy and has MYP approval criteria changed as a result of recent acquisition refoim 
initiatives?" 
Subsidiary Questions to this topic are: 
1. What are the current policies and regulations pertaining to MYP? 
2. What has been DOD's experience with Congress' MYP approval process? 
3. What are the primary Congressional considerations leading to MYP approval/rejection 
decisions? 
4. Has Congress adhered to its stated MYP approval/rejection criteria? 
5. What is the DOD's experience with MYP program cancellations? 
6. What is the relationship between the rationale Congress has given for rejection of 
, 
MYPs and their stated approval/rejection criteria? 
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7. Has Congress ,altered MYP policies as a result of recent acquisition reform 
initiatives? 
8. is the amount of Congressional control over the DOD's MYP process appropriate? 
9. How might MYP policy be changed to improve the acquisition process? 
E. METHODOLOGY 
First, a literature review was conducted to determine MYP background and definition of 
current Federal laws and regulations. Data were gathered through various Government 
hOIl.lepages on the internet, LEXISINEXIS, Government and literary publications, existing Naval 
Postgraduate School thesis work, and legislative historical documents. 
Second, research were conducted to find Congressional approval/rejection results of 
DOD MYP requests. This data was attained from Annual Presidential Budget Requests, DOD 
Budget Procurement Programs (P-l), Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (OUSD) papers, 
and DOD Appropriation and Authorization Acts. 
Third, data were gathered to determine Congressional, DOD and third party perspectives 
on the primary and subsidiary questions. On-site visits were performed at the OUSD, 
Acquisition and Technology and OUSD Comptroller. A second on-site visit was conducted at 
the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) professional staff at the Russell building in 
Washington D.C. During these site visits, key personnel in the MYP process were interviewed 
and additional data were gathered. United States General Accounting Office reports were 
utilized to provide an objective analysis of specific MYP candidates. 
Finally, these data are analyzed to answer the above research questions and to facilitate 
recommendations and conclusions. 
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F. ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
After Congress approves a DOD MYP request, it is enacted into law by a Federal 
Appropriation Act, or as of fiscal year 1998, an Appropriation and an "other than Appropriations 
Act". (Ref: 92) When a MYP candidate is disapproved, usually there is not any documentation 
at all. It is simply not appropriated or authorized by Congress. In the rare occurrence when the 
disapproval is written into law, it merely says the MYP request has been rejected. Furthermore, 
when a MYP request is approv.ed, the legislation merely says the request is approved. Congress' 
reasons for this legislation are not expressly given for the approval or rejection in writing. 
Indicators may be sent through liaison channels between Congress and DOD or through 
Congressional hearings, but the reasons for approval and rejection are normally not provided in 
writing. GAO assessments of some MYP candidates are utilized by this thesis to provide insight 
into why these programs may have been approved or rejected. 
When seeking the precise data on MYP requests that are considered by Congress for 
approval or rejection, it is impossible to find every request. There are many avenues that lead to 
Capitol Hill. The majority of requests are submitted via the standard procedure within the DOD 
Appendix to the President's budget. Other requests may be submitted out of cycle through OSD 
to Congress. Sometimes, the Services go directly to Congress and bypass OSD. Finally, there 
have been times when Congress takes the initiative to grant approval for programs, which they 
desire to see entered into as MYPs. As a result, it is occasionally not known that Congress is 
consi~e~ng a program for MYP, until the Appropriation and Authorization Acts are passed into 
law and made public. The researcher pieced together data from many acts of legislation as well 
as DOD records to get the most accurate picture possible. 
5 
G. DEFINITIONS AND TERMS 
Appropriations: A provision of legal authority by an act of Congress, which pennits Federal 
agencies to incur obligations and to make payments out.of the Treasury for specific purposes. ~n 
appropriation usually follows an act of authorization legislation. (Ref. 53: vol. 2A 010107.B.5) 
Authorization: Legislation enacted by Congress which establishes or continues the legal 
operation of a Federal program or agency for a specific period of time. This legislation is 
normally a prerequisite to appropriation legislation. (Ref. 53: vol. 2A 010107.B.6) 
Cancellation: The cancellation, within a contractually specified time, of the total requirements of 
all remaining program years. Cancellation results when the contracting officer notifies the 
contractor of nonavailability of funds for contract performance for any subsequent program year, 
or Fails to notify the contractor that funds are available for performance of the succeeding 
program year requirement. (Ref. 56: 17.103) 
Cancellation Ceiling: The maximum cancellation charge that the contractor can receive in the 
event of cancellation. (Ref. 56: 17.103) 
Cancellation Charge: The amount of costs, which have not yet been recovered, that would have 
been recouped through amortization over the full term of the contract, including the term 
canceled. (Ref. 56: 17.103) 
Economic Order Ouantity (EOO) Procurement: An exception to the full funding policy, which 
allows the use of advance procurement to purchase more than one fiscal year's program 
increment of components, materials, and parts in order to obtain economical advantages, sustain 
a production line, to support low rate initial production, etc .. (Ref. 99: p. 3) 
Multiyear Procurements: The process, planning and contract for purchase of property or services 
for more than one, but no more than five, program years. A multiyear contract may provide that 
performance under the contract during the second and following years of the contract is 
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contingent upon the availability of appropriated funds. A mUltiyear contract may also provide 
for a cancellation payment to be made to the contractor if funding is not available. The key 
difference between a mUltiyear contract and a series of yearly contracts is that the mUltiyear 
contract is acquiring end products for multiple years vice only for an annual requirement. (Refs. 
112: 2306b and 99: 17.103) 
President's Budget:. The budget that the President proposes to Congress for a particular fiscal 
year. It is usually transmitted in late January or early February preceding the new fiscal year. 
Program Objective Memorandum (POM): The final product of the DOD programming process. 
It describes the resource allocation decisions of the Military Departments. 
Termination Liability: The maximum cost the Government would incur if a contract were 
terminated. (Ref. 99: p.4) 
Total Obligation Authority (TOA): The sum of all budget authority plus amounts authorized to 
be credited to a specific fund. 
H. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
This the~is consists of the following five chapters: 
1. Introduction. The introduction provides the overall framework of the thesis. It 
provides a general overview and defines the thesis' objective, scope, research questions, 
methodology, assumptions, limitations and definitions. 
2. Background. This chapter provides background on DOD and Government 
acquisition refonn initiatives. It describes the legislation, regulations and procedures applicable 




3. Methodology and Data Presentation. This chapter presents raw data to be used for 
analysis. These data include the Congressional MYP approval/rejection results from fiscal years 
1982 through 1999 and GAO assessments of several of these MYP candidates. 
4. Data Analysis and Interpretation. This chapter synthesizes the issues raised by 
the research questions utilizing the data presented in Chapters I, II and III, as well as other data 
and interviews relevant to the analysis. 
5. This. chapter answers the research questions, provides recommendations to 
improve the MYP process and offer areas for future research. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. GOVERNMENT REFORM 
In the 1980s, America's focus was on domestic economy and the great communist threat 
led by the Soviet Union. President Ronald Reagan was leading the charge to thwart the 
Communists while at the same time being instrumental in causing the Federal debt to spiral 
higher and higher. The environment of the 1990s has experienced a great change in America's 
focus. The economy has thrived and the Soviet threat has diminished. Attention has shifted 
from the Cold War to the enormous Federal debt of the United States. 
President Bill Clinton and Vice President AI Gore have taken the lead in reinventing the 
Government. The following are select quotations from the National Performance Review (NPR), 
which provide a feeling for the environment that the Clinton Administration is fostering in 
today's government. 
We (the President and Vice President) agreed (in 1993) that we 
needed to bring a revolution to the federal government - to put the wheels 
back on. We agreed right then that we needed to bring a revolution to the 
federal government: We called it reinventing government. 
We went to work to create a government that works so much better 
and costs so much less that Americans will regain faith in the institution of 
government. 
Our models, teachers, and partners in this historic undertaking are 
America's best-run companies -companies that led the quality revolution of 
the past two decades .... They have been through the learning curve, they 
have made the mistakes and fixed them, all while dealing with the risks of a 
free market. 
We are making the big change. Here are some examples: The 
smallest federal civilian workforce in over 30 years ... A big reduction in red 
tape and government bureaucracy ... A new spirit in government, in which 
creativity and innovation are rewarded, not frowned upon. 
Reinvent to get the job done with less. Seek congressional relief 
from wasteful restrictions. 
Money is becoming increasingly scarce. In this world, the 
government can get the job done if - and only if - we unlock this unused 
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human potential available to us. Agency heads personally need to do things 
to unlock this potential. (Ref. 59: chp. 1) 
It is clear from these statements and recommendations that the Presidential 
Administration is trying to motivate Government personnel, to seek to do "more with less" and 
to adopt methods of proven successful commercial companies. If legislation stands in the way, 
people should lobby to get these restrictive laws changed. If "rice bowl" protection is holding 
back progress of making improvements in the system, apply pressure to drive change. The 
Clinton Administration has laid the groundwork for Government change. They have provided 
incentives to reward those who are making change and joining the "reinventing government" 
team. 
B. ACQUISITION REFORM 
Government reinvention naturally leads to acquisition reform. The Clinton 
Administration has led by example and directed military and civilian agencies alike to reform the 
Government's acquisition system. 
1. Section 800 Panel 
The Fiscal Year 91 National Defense Authorization Act, section 800, Public Law 101-
510 mandated the creation of the Acquisition Law Advisory Panel, commonly know as the 
Section 800 Panel. This committee was a vehicle for Congress to begin the process of 
streamlining Government acquisition in the name of achieving the "peace dividend" as a result of 
the end of the "Cold War". The panel reviewed 600 laws. They recommended changing 298 
laws and doing away with 124 ofthem. (Ref. 98) Significant recommendations from the panel 
include: 
-Simplify acquisition procedures for purchases under $100,000. 
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-Initiate 'pilot' commercial programs. These prototype programs would use commercial 
rather than military acquisition procedures. 
-Increase the use of commercial specifications. 
-Limit application of regulations on procurement of commercial items. (Ref. 7) 
2. National Performance Review (NPR) 
As discussed above, the purpose of the NPR was to improve the efficiency and 
effectiveness' of Government. Major points of the NPR include a call for a revision of Federal 
procurement regulations from rigid rules into guiding principles, decentralizing authority to 
purchase computers, testing and electronic marketplace, increasing the small purchases 
threshold, and relying more on commercial of-the-shelf (COTS) products. (Ref. 94) Additional 
highlights include: permitting taxpayers to pay by credit card, Government consolidation and 
downsizing, adopting a two-year vice one-year budget cycle, giving supervisors greater 
authority, involving private industry to a greater degree in the inspection process and 
privatization of some non-Government inherent functions. (Ref. 103: pp. 1-2) 
3. Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 (FASA). 
This legislation was me'ant to continue the acquisition reform movement by legislating or 
codifying change. Many of the recommendations from the NPR and the Section 800 Panel were 
incorporated into F ASA. Highlights of F ASA include: 
-Direct creation of an electronic acquisition network. This requirement was realized in 
the Federal Acquisition Computer Network (FACNET) . 
. 
-Set preference for acquisition of commercial items. 
-Raise small purchase thresholds. 
-Encourage use of purchase credit cards. 
-Streamline the bid/protest procedures. 
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-Eliminate many Government specific clauses. 
-Apply commercial procedures to Government. 
-Streamline acquisition procedures. (Refs. 5 and 94: p. 66) 
In general, FASA was designed to streamline the lengthy acquisition procedures to make 
Government procurement operate more efficiently like the best world-class commercial 
corporations. 
4. Acquisition Reform'Mandate for Change. 
Secretary of Defense William Perry promulgated the Acquisition Reform Mandate for 
Change in response to the Clinton Administration direction. This mandate was consistent with 
the movement to make Government and the DOD operate more efficiently. To meet the new 
National security challenges (political, economic, and military) DOD must: 
(1) Maintain its technological superiority, and a strong, globally 
competitive National industrial base that can support the Nation's future 
defense needs, by being able to: 
-Rapidly purchase commercial and other state-of-the-art 
products and technology from reliable suppliers who utilize the latest 
manufacturing and management techniques; 
-Assist in the conversion of defense-unique companies to dual-
use production; 
-Aid in the transfer of military technology to the commercial 
sector; and, 
-Preserve defense-unique core capabilities. 
(2) Reduce acquisition costs (including DOD's overhead costs) through: 
-The adoption by DOD of business processes characteristic of 
world-class customers and suppliers (including processes that 
encourage DOD's suppliers to do the same); and, 
-Relief from the requirement to impose Government-unique 
terms and conditions on its contractors to the maximum extent 
practicable. (Ref. 95: p. 3) 
Secretary Perry further declared achievement of these goals would be challenging and 
that many barriers were firmly entrenched in the Government's organization. For instance, 
industry identified the following significant barriers: 
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-Unique laws and regulations imposed on contractors such as Cost Accounting Standards, 
cost and pricing data, accounting systems, oversight requirements, socio-economic requirements, 
technical data rights, security requirements, DOD specifications and standards. 
-Instability of DOD's requirements and associated funding make it difficult to predict 
future marke~ requirements. 
-hnposition of Government specific rules on subcontractors. 
-Governmen.t's right to terminate contracts for its convenience. 
-Industry's perception that they are "walking through a minefield" of laws and 
regulations, that they will sometime slip up and face criminal or civil legal action which wil~ hurt 
the firm's reputation. (Ref. 94: p. 4) 
5. Federal Acquisition Reform Act of 1996 (FARA) 
This legislation was passed into law as Division D of the National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (Public Law 104-106). FARA continued the acquisition streamlining 
trend set by FASA. Highlights of F ARA include: 
-Defining efficient competition. 
-Increasing thresholds for higher level approval. 
-Establishing efficient competitive range determinations. 
-Exempting requirements and raising thresholds for commercial items. (Ref. 57) 
FARA was later combined with the Information Technology Management Reform Act of 
1996 (ITMRA), to be renamed the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996. ITMRA made ,several 
streamlining initiatives consistent with acquisition reform of the 1990s. Highlights of ITMRA 
include: 
-Give Information Technology (IT) procurement authority back to the agencies. 
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-Eliminate Federal Information Resources Management Regulation which governed 
acquisition and management of Federal Information Processing resources. 
-Move the General Services Board of Contract Appeals authority to hear bid protests on 
IT contracts to the GAO. 
-Encourage incremental acquisition of IT systems. 
-Encourage acquisition of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) IT products. 
-Authorize Federal Agencies to explore alternative approaches for IT. 
-Promote management processes that maximize value and accurately assess risk of IT 
acquisitions. (Ref. 100: p.1) 
-Ensure information security polices, procedures and practices are adequate. 
The combined effects ofFASA and Clinger/Cohen were to implement the acquisition 
reform initiatives that the citizens of the United States demanded, and the Congress and the 
Clinton Administration delivered. 
c. MULTIYEAR PROCUREMENT LEGISLATION AND REGULATION 
The historical record of MYP since the 1960s demonstrates that the level of 
Congressional Control over DOD's MYP process has varied greatly. 
The 1960s were a period of loose congressional control, where multiyear contracts 
flourished and were very successful. The 1970s marked a stark shift from the 1960s. The 
Department of the Navy presented Congress with two very large cancellation charges. This 
prompted Congress to clamp down on multiyear contracts, by legislating a maximum $5 million 
cancellation ceiling. This act virtually eliminated major acquisitions from MYPs for the 
remainder of the decade. (Ref. 100: p.8) 
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In the early 1980s, Congress loosened control and encouraged use of MYPs in efforts to 
reduce cost and increase program stability. The following statement is from the fiscal year 1982 
DOD Authorization Act: 
The Congress finds that in order to ensure national defense preparedness, to 
conserve fiscal resources, and to enhance defense production capability, it is 
in the interest of the United States to acquire property and services for the 
Department of Defense in the most timely, economic, and efficient manner. 
It is therefore the policy of the Congress that services and property . 
(including weapon systems and associated items) for the Department of 
Defense be acquired by any kind of contract, other than cost-plus-a-
percentage -of-cost contracts, but including mUltiyear contracts, that will 
promote the interest of the United States. Further, it is the policy of the 
Congress that such contracts, when practicable, provide for the purchase of 
property at times and in quantities that will result in reduced cost to the 
Government and provide incentives to contractors to improve productivity 
through investment in capital facilities, equipment, and advanced 
technology. (Ref. 82: sec 909(a)(2)) 
In the late 1980s, the tide had changed again tending towards tighter congressional 
control. DOD was now required to submit all MYP candidates in the Presidential Budget 
Request. Congress, often with assistance from the GAO, would then analyze each proposal. 
Congress had to specifically authorize by written act of law before DOD could enter into MYP. 
(Ref. 82: pp. 9-10) 
The Fiscal Year 1989 National Defense Authorization :Act stated that a MYP must 
achieve 10 percent savings over the current negotiated contracts or 12 percent over the costs of a 
new series of annual contracts if recent contract experience does not exist. (Ref. 83: sec 
107(d)(3)) 
The Fiscal Year 1991 National Defense Authorization Act eased the required savings or 
cost avoidance rate from 10 percent to "substantial". (Ref. 85: sec. 808) 
In the early to mid 1990s, there was a call for greater fiscal efficiency in Government. As 
I 
part of F ASA, Congress provided the MYP legislation that is virtually intact today as United 
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States Code (USC) Title l,O-Armed Forces, Section 2306b. This statute states that the head of an 
agency may consider entering into mUltiyear contracts for the purchase of property whenever the 
following criteria are met: 
-Substantial Savings. The use of a MYP contract will result in substantial savings of 
total anticipated costs versus utilizing a series of annual contracts. 
-Stable Requirement. The minimum need for the material to be purchased is expected 
to remain substantially unchanged during the potential contract period in terms of 
procurement rate, total quantities and production rate. 
-Stable Funding. There is a reasonable expectation that the agency will request the 
required funding to support the MYP. 
-Stable Design. The material has a stable design in which the technical risks are not 
excessive. 
-Realistic Cost Savings. The estimates of both the MYP contract cost and the cost 
avoidance are realistic as compared to a series of annual procurements. 
-Promote National Security. Using MYP to procure this item will promote the national 
security of the United States. 
Other highlights from USC 10-2306b include: 
Cancellation Notice. Before any MYP with a cancellation ceiling in excess of $100,000 
is awarded, the head of the agency must give written notification to Congress. 
Termination Notice. A MYP cannot be terminated without notification to Congress at 
least ten days prior to termination. (Ref. 112: sec. 2306b) 
When the legislation states that Congress must be notified, it means the following four 
committees/sub-committees must be notified in writing: 
-Committee on Armed Services of the Senate. 
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-Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate. 
-Committee on National Security of the House of Representatives. 
-Subcommittee on National Security of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
Representatives. (Ref. 91) 
The Fiscal Year 1998 DOD Authorization Act made the following change to USC 10-
2306b: MYPs cannot qe awarded for greater than $500 million without written act of law in the 
form of an appropriation act and'an "other than appropriation act". This legislation is analyzed in 
Chapter IV, Section D. 
In addition to the legislation above, the annual DOD appropriation and authorization bills 
also currently contain the following language pertaining to MYPs. DOD must attain 
Congressional approval for any mUltiyear candidate which meets any of the following: 
-The proposed MYP's value is expected to be in excess of $500 million. 
-There are economic order quantity (EOQ) procurements in excess of $20 million in any 
one year. 
-There are EOQ procurements in advance of a MYP contract, which is greater than $20 
million in anyone year. 
-There will be unfunded contingent liability in excess of $20 million in anyone year. 
-The procurement quantities of a MYP approved previously will be changed. (Ref. 53: 
Chp. IV) 
D. MULTIYEAR PROCUREMENT APPROVAL PROCESS 
The Defense Department identifies MYP candidates during the Planning, Programming 
and Budgeting System (PPBS) process. During the Programming phase, each Service prepares a 
Program Objective Memorandum (POM). The POM identifies the specific programs which the 
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agency proposes for the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP). The Services then present their 
POMs to the Defense Resource Planning Board (DRPB). The DRPB then makes final decisions 
about the POMs in the fonn of Program Decision Memoranda (PDMs). The comptrollers then 
take the direction from the PDMs and fonn the proposed budget. The Defense Department then 
submits their MYP candidates within the DOD budget to the President. ,Major Acquisitions with 
expected values in excess of $500 million are required to submit exhibits MYF-l through 
MYP-4 from the DOD Financial Management Regulation. These exhibits for the T -45TS 
program that was requested in the Fiscal Year 1999 Presidential Budget are included as 
Appendices B through E .. The exhibits are briefly summarized as follows: 
-Exhibit MYP-l, Multiyear Procurement Criteria. This exhibit describes the system 
being procured, demonstrates how the six criteria for MYP are satisfied, demonstrates the 
. savings and advantages of MYP, describes the impact on the industrial base and provides a 
summary of the proposal. 
-Exhibit MYP-2, Total Program Funding Plan. This exhibit provides detailed financial. 
data including procurement quantity, annual procurement costs, MYP costs, MYP savings, and 
outlays for the total program. 
-Exhibit MYP-3, Contract Funding Plan. MYP-3 provides data similar to MYP-2, but 
only for the proposed MYP. 
-Exhibit MYP-4, Present Value Analysis. This exhibit perfonns a present value 
coinparison between perfonning the program with a series of annual contracts versus a MYP. 
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is the President's organization, which is 
responsible for preparing the President's Budget. The President's Budget defines how much 
money the Executive Branch claims they require to op~rate for the following fiscal year. This 
includes identification of when they want to enter into a MYP. The President's budget will offer 
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proposed legislative language of what the President (and DOD) would like to see legislated by 
the appropriation and authorization bills. (Refs. 113: p. 7 and 27) 
The authorizing and appropriating committees described earlier in the House of 
Representatives and the Senate will then begin the legislative process of verifying the proposed 
MYP candid~tes. The decision on the MYP candidate will go through a series of votes from 
subcommittees, to committees, to all of the House and the Senate to the Conference Committees. 
Finally a separate POD authorization and appropriation bill is sent to the President for 
ratification. Once the President approves each bill, it becomes law. The specific program must 
be approved for MYP in both the appropriation and authorization bill in order 'for the speci~c 
MYP program to be entered into by DOD. (Ref. 28: pp. 28-36) 
E. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT 
The framers of the United States constitution established three independent, yet 
interrelated branches of Government. Their objective was to create a separation of powers? 
which restrained anyone branch from becoming too powerful and would foster a spirit of 
cooperation that would be necessary for the Government to operate effectively. Essentially, the 
Congressional branch enacts the laws, the Judicial branch interprets the laws, and the Executive 
branch executes them. The spirit of cooperation, which is required, is fundamental to the 
national decision making. (Ref. 93) 
Article 1, Section 8 of the United States Constitution gives Congress th~ authority to 
review Government operations and administration including DOD. The level of Congressional 
review or oversight over the Government and DOD has increased over the past 30 years for 
several reasons. First, the public's growing distrust of Government officials punctuated by 
presidential scandals has led the charge for increasing oversight. Second, media hyped stories of 
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exceedingly high priced hammers and toilet seats have lead the public to believe that additional 
oversight is required to ensure procuring agents are performing their job properly. Thirdly, 
growth of entitlement spending has put pressure on Government to reduce spending in areas 
other than entitlements, namely discretionary areas. DOD is the largest discretionary spending 
account within the Government. Forth, the further time passes from the draft wars, fewer 
members of Congress will have served in the military. This raises their need for Congress to ask 
more questions to ensure that DOD is performing properly and spending the country's tax dollars 
efficiently. These factors have all been significant pressures to increase Congressional oversight. 
(Ref. 28: pp.23-24.) 
F.SUMMARY 
The 1990s have been a decade of Government reform highlighted by acquisition reform. 
The President has fostered an environment that is open to and encouraging change. The DOD 
budget process, which includes the MYP approval, is a lengthy process that involves many . 
governmental organizations in the Executive as well at the Legislative Branches. The process 
allows many different interest groups to have input to the process, but as a result, is very time 
consuming. The following chapter will provide the MYP approval data and GAO MYP 
assessments that are analyzed in Chapter N. 
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III. METHODOLOGY AND DATA PRESENTATION 
A. METHODOLOGY FOR ATTAINING DATA 
This section outlines the methodology for acquiring the data presented in this chapter. 
The first section is "a table that represents every MYP candidate that the DOD has proposed since 
1982. These data were gathered from Presidential Budget Requests, DOD Authorization and 
Appropriation Acts, OUSD (Comptroller) MYP reports and an Assistant Secretary of the Navy 
Aviation MYP report. The total obligation authority (TOA) savings projections were gathered 
from OUSD (Comptroller) MYP reports and personal phone interviews. The data on the 
programs that were terminated were gathered by conducting a literature review and by 
interviewing numerous DOD officials. The data on approved MYPs that did not reach contract 
award as a MYP were attained from OUSD (Comptroller) reports, Presidential Budget Requests 
and a literature review. 
The GAO reports that are summarized in the second section below are all evaluations of 
MYP candidates or existing programs. They were attained by a literature review in the Dudley 
. Knox Library at the Naval Postgraduate School and at the GAO internet web site. 
B. MULTIYEAR PROCUREMENT APPROVALIDISAPPROVAL RECORD 
Table 3.B.l illustrates Congress' approval/disapproval record for DOD MYP requests for 
fiscal years 1982 through 1999. It also shows each MYP candidate's estimated TOA savings for 
MYPs which were approved, awarded and not terminated. The DOD determined these TOA 
estimates. Programs that were approved, but the DOD did not enter into MYP are annotated 
with the phrase, "Not executed as MYP". The MYPs which were awarded and then terminated 
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at a later date are annotated by the word, "Tenninated". The Army small arms programs, which 
were requested in 1998, were pre-approved by Congress and thus did not submit estimated TOA 
savings. They are annotated" Not required". 
C. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORTS 
The followi)1g are analyses ofMYP candidates and existing programs performed by the 
GAO during the 1980s and 1990s. The results of these reports are not fact, but they are deemed 
to be an objective opinion of the MYP decision criteria. 
1. Procurement: An Assessment of the Air Force's F-16 Multiyear Contract, 
February 1986 
This assessment was an analysis of issues relating to the F-16 MYP for fiscal years 1982-
1985. It reported that in October 1981, the time of DOD's submission of the MYP request to 
Congress, savings were projected to be $246 million or 7.7% for a MYP versus annual funding. 
The F-16 program was approved for MYP by the Fiscal Year 1982 Defense Appropriations Act. 
(Ref.108) 
2. Procurement: Assessment of DOD's Multiyear Contract Candidates, 
September 1988 
This report was an analysis of the seven MYP candidates proposed by DOD in the 
amended fiscal years 1988-1989 biennial budget. The objective was to determine if the 
candidates proposed by the DOD satisfied the legislative criteria for MYP. Table 3.C.l 
summarizes the results. 
Table 3.C.l is a brief summary of the most significant parts of GAO's analyses of the 
MYP candidates proposed for fiscal year 1989. 
22 
Table 3.B.l 
DOD Estimate of 
Year Requested Program Approved Disapproved TOA Savings in 
Millions of US$ 
1982 F-16 Airframe X 256.8 
TRC-170 Radio X 16.0 
C-2 Airframe X 89.0 
UH-60 Helicopter X 79.4 
ALQ-136 Radio Jammer X 34.6 
SM-1 (Rocket Motor) X 10.1 
M-1 Fire Control X 117.3 
NA VST AR Satellite X 212.2 
1983 Multiple Launch Rocket System X 209.1 
T-700 Engine X 33.7 
KC-10 X 658.0 
NATO Sea sparrow (Kits) X 36.8 
MK 46 Torpedo X 86.0 
DMSP X 58.2 
MK 60 Tank Thermal Sight X Not executed as 
MYP 
.' 
Ch-53 Helicopter X 
EA-6B X 
MULE, ANIPAQ-3 X 
TAO Fleet Oiler X 
A-6E Airframe X 
Standard Missile X 
1984 B-1B (Airframe and Major Subsystems) X 1,188.2 
B-1B Spares X 158.9 
TB-16 Towed Array X 2.3 
MK 45 Gun MountIMK-6 Hoist X 61.8 
A-6E TRAM Sensors X 73.8 
M-9 Armored Combat Earthmover X Not executed as 
MYP 
AH-64 Engine X 41.4 
Bradley Components X 109.1 
.' .CNCE X 
LSD-41 X 
F-15 Aircraft X 
KC-135 Re-engine X 
MK-30 Target X 
. AN/SSQ-62 DICASS Sonobuoy X 
ANITSQ-lll Communications Element X 
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-------------------- ------------ -
Table 3.B.l (cont.) 
DOD Estimate of 
Year Requested Program Approved Disapproved TOA Savings in 
Millions of US$ 
1984 TOW 2 Missile X , 
F/A-18 Engine X 
C-47D Modification X 
1985 UH-60IEH-60 Airframe X 129.5 
5-Ton Truck . X 58.1 
Ch-47 Modernization X 153.4 
Bradley Turret Drive X 10.6 
Shop Equipment Contact Maintenance X 74.3 
AN/SSQ-36 Sonobuoy X 1.6 
F-16 Airframe X 259.6 
DCSC Satellite X 139.8 
CH-53 Mainframe X 129.3 
Tow 2 Missile X 
Bushmaster 25mm Gun X 
F-I6 Simulator X 
1986 T -700 Series Engine X 71.1 
MIAI Tank Chassis X 403.1 
MIAI Tank Engine X 160.8 
MIA! Fire Control X 96.8 
Bradley Transmission X 25.5 
LHD X Not executed as 
MYP 
MK-46 Torpedo Program X Terminated 
M9 ACE X 
1987 UH-60IEH-60 Airframe X 139.8 
STINGER Missile System X 211.7 
PATRIOT Missile -System X 445.3 
MK-45 Gun MountIHoist X 48.7 
Defense Support Program X 455.5 
Titan IV (CELV) X 430.0 
F/A-I8 Aircraft X 
HARM Missile X 
1988 Hawk Missile X Terminated 
TOW II Missile X 53.0 
HMMWV X Not executed as 
MYP 
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Table 3.B.l (cont.) 
DOD Estimate of 
Year Requested Program Approved Disapproved TOA Savings in 
Millions of US$ 
1988 AN/ALQ-136 Jammer X 
Harpoon Missile X 
1989 CH-47 Mod X 118.3 
MLRS X 126.9 
UHF Follow-on Satellite X 194.8 
A V -8B Aircraft X· 165.5 
DMSP X 99.6 
F-16 Aircraft X Not executed as 
MyP 
T-700 Engine (For H-60) X 44.6 
Ml Tank X Not executed as 
MYP 
AH-64 Helicopter X Not executed as 
MYP 
1990 M1 Tank Chassis X Not executed as 
MYP 
M1 Tank Engine X Not executed as 
MYP 
Ml Tank Fire Control Sys X Not executed as 
MYP 
Palletized Load System (FHTV) X 153.1 
Bradley FVS Vehicle X Not executed as 
MYP 
Bradley FVS Tow 2 Subsystem X Not executed as 
MYP 
DDG-51 Destroyer X Not executed as 
MYP 
SH-60B Helicopter X Not executed as 
MYP 
SH-60F Helicopter X Not executed as 
MYP 




AH-64 Helicopter X 
Improved Recovery Vehicle X 
25 
Table 3.B.l (cont.) 
DOD Estimate of 
Year Requested Program Approved Disapproved TOA Savings in 
Millions of US$ 
1990 FMTV X 
Stinger-RMP X 
Line of Sight - Rear X 
UH-60M Helicopter X 
Phoenix Missile X 
F/A 18 Aircraft X 
MK-45 Gun Mount X 
E-2C Aircraft X 
EA-6B Aircraft X 
Tomahawk Missile X 
F-15 Aircraft X 
Combined Effect Munitions X 
KC-135 Re-engine X 
B-2 Engine X 
B-2 Airframe X 
DSP Satellite X 
NA VSTAR GPS ." X 
C-17 Aircraft X 
Medium Launch Vehicle X 
ANffRC-170 Radio X 
AMRAAM Missile X 
1991 Line of Sight (Avenger) X 60.8 
FMTV X Terminated 
LCAC Landing Craft X Not executed as 
MYP 
LHD Amphibious Ship X Not executed as 
MYP 
NAVSTARGPS X 115.3 
MK-45 Gun MountIMK-6 Ammo Hoist X 48.4 
UH-60 Black Hawk Helicopter X 
1992: .C-17 Airframe X 
ARMY Tactical Missile System X Not executed as 
(ATTACMS) MYP 
MK-48 ADCAP Torpedo X 50.3 
UH-60 Black Hawk Helicopter X 67.0 
. 
1993 Enhanced Modulated Signal Processor X Not Available 
Defense Sup~ort Program X 90.1 
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Table 3.B.l (cont.) 
DOD Estimate of 
Year Requested Program Approved Disapproved TOA Savings in 
Millions of US$ 
1994 120mm Tank Rounds X 137.0 
1995 No New MYPs Requested 
1996 C-17 Airframe X 834.8 
C-17 engine X 175.6 
Global Positioning System X 30.3 
1997 UH-60 Blackhawk Helicopter X 47.8 
Apache Longbow Helicopter X 131.8 
M1A2 Tank Upgrade X 236.0 
1998 Javelin Missile X 102.4 
DDG-51 Destroyer X 788.0 
MK19-3 grenade machine guns X Not required 
M16A2 rifles X Not required 
M249 Squad Automatic Weapons X Not required 
M4 carbine rifles X Not required 
M240B machine guns X Not required 
Army Tactical Missile Sys. X 35.1 
(ATTACMS) 
1999 E-2C Aircraft X 204.0 
Longbow Hellfire Missile X 133.8 
Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement X 
Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles X 118.8 
A V -8B Aircraft X 33.0 
Apache Longbow Radar X 79.4 
T -45 Aircraft X 
Total 11,537.0 
(Refs. 10-22,29-41,60,64,66,69, 73, 75, 77-81, 99, and 103-110) 
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L__ _____________________________________ _ 
Table 3.e.1 
System DOD Est. Realism Requirement Funding Design 
MYPSavings of Stability Stability Stability 
Percent Savin~s 
CH-47 D 13.2 ? ? 
H-60 12.2 ? ? 
MLRS 11.4 ? 
AV-8B 11.9 ? ? 
UHF Follow-on Satellite 11.5 ? ? 
DMSP 18.1 ? 
F-16 5.7 ? ? 
Table Code: 
"?" indicates that the system does not clearly meet the legislated criterion. A "?" does not 
necessarily mean the system was an inappropriate candidate, but that there was increased risk in 
that area. This risk must be weighed against the other factors to determine whether MYP 
authority should be granted. 
a. CH-47D Chinook Helicopter Modernization 
The analysis indicated stability of funding and realism of savings as not clearly 
meeting the legislated criteria. This modification has been in MYP since 198~. The Army did 
not have the contractor's cost estimate for an annual contract. The Army made its own. 
determination of the annual C?st estimate. Therefore, the cost savings comparing annual and 
multiyear are questionable. Additionally, Army officials stated that the CH-47D modernization 
program would not be funded due to overall funding constraints. Office of Secretary of Defense 
(OSD) officials claimed they would support the program. This ambiguity led GAO to the 
conclusion that funding was not stable and that the Army was not completely committed to this 
program. 
b. T-700 Enginefor H-60 Helicopter 
The analysis indicated requirement stability and realism of savings as not clearly 
meeting the legislated criteria. The older version of the T -700 engine has been on MYP. 
Accurate annual procurement estimates have not been requested nor provided by the contractor. 
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The proposed quantity was for 676 engines. The Army expected the volume could increase to at 
least 1,156 due to: (1) increased Black Hawk procurement, (2) potential additional engine for 
the Apache helicopter and (3) engine procurement for Air Force requirements. This was 
potentially a tremendous growth in the requirement, which led GAO to its conclusion that the 
requirement was not stable. 
c. Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) 
The analysis indicated savings realism as not clearly meeting the legislated 
criteria. The MLRS was currently in the last year ora MYP. The proposed MYP cost estimate 
was based on the existing program. The Army requested both annual and MYP cost estimates 
and expected to receive them by September 1988. 
d. A V-SB Harrier Aircraft 
The analysis indicated stability of requirement and funding as not clearly meeting 
the legislated criteria. The Marine Corps' requirement was steady, but the Department of the 
Navy's commitment to the AV-8B was low. The Navy's amended fiscal year 1989 budget 
request planned to stop production following the fiscal year 1989 procurement. "OSD and Navy 
officials told us (GAO) that the program was in search of stability and that one reason for 
proposing a mUltiyear contract was an attempt to provide the program the stability it has 
historically lacked." (Ref. 110: p. 20) 
e. UHF Follow-on Satellite System 
The analysis indicated savings realism did not clearly meet the legislated criteria. 
This system had not been produced. The Navy's estimates were based on the assumption that 
savings would be similar on this satellite program as previously purchased communication 
satellite programs. The Navy had received both annual and mUltiyear proposals from three 
contractors, but did not make them available to GAO because of source selection sensitivity. 
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The Navy assured GAO that the actual proposals were consistent with the estimates provided to 
GAO. 
f. Defense Meteorological Satellite Program 
The analysis indicated realism of savings did not clearly meet the legislated 
criteria. The Air Force based its MYP estimates on another, yet similar program. Limited cost 
data was available to support the annual contract estimates. The Air Force's cost and savings 
estimates were inconsistent with the budget plans for fiscal years 1990-1994. 
g. F-16 Fighting Falcon Aircraft 
The analysis indicated that stability of requirement and realism of savings did not 
clearly meet the legislated criteria. The MYP package was submitted for a quantity of 630 
airframes. The Air Force's budget only funded 480 F-16 aircraft during this that period. Air 
·Force officials considered diverting funding to the A-7F aircraft, which would reduce the F-16 
MYP quantity down to only 400. The Air Force's savings estimates were not based on current 
proposals, but on two prior multiyear contracts. (Ref. 110: pp. 10-30) 
3. Procurement: Assessment of DOD's MUltiyear Contract Candidates, 
September 1989 
This report is an analysis of the eight of the 27 MYP candidates proposed by DOD in the 
amended fiscal years 1990-1991 biennial budget. The objective was to determine if the 
candidates satisfied the legislative criteria for MYP. Table 3.C.2 summarizes the results. 
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Table 3.C.2 
System DOD Est. Realism Requirement Funding Design 
MYrSavings of Stability Stability Stability 
Percent Savings 
Maverick 12.3 ? ? 
KC-135R 13.0 ? 
CEM 10.0 ? 
Ml Tank 10.9 ? ? 
Bradley 12.5 
PLS 12.7 ? ? ? ? 
F/A-18 5.5 ? ? 
E-2C 13.6 ? ? 
Table Code: "?" signifies same meaning as in Table 3.C.1. 
The following will be a brief summary of the most significant parts of GAO's analyses of 
the MYP candidates that are summarized in Table 3.C.2: 
a. Maverick Imaging Infrared Missile 
The analysis indicated stability of requirement and funding as not clearly meeting the 
legislated criteria. The Air Force reduced the program requirement by 37,168 missiles (61 
percent) due to budget constraints and reconsideration of DOD's anti-armor requirements. The 
Navy had concerns over testing. 
b. KC-J3SR Re-engine Program 
The analysis indicated savings realism did not clearly meet the legislated criteria. 
The Air Force MYP savings estimate was based on unit pricing data provided by the contractor 
for 36 engine sets per year. The Air Force assumed their projected MYP would avoid base-year 
price increases, even though the quantities to be procured were less than 36 in some years. The 
contractor projected there would not be any saving on quantities less than 36. The Air Force also 
used Office of Management and Budget (OMB) inflation rates. GAO estimated the savings 
would be only 2.7 percent vice the 16.8 percent projected by the Air Force. 
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c. Combined Effects Munition (CEM) 
The analysis indicated savings realism did not clearly meet the legislated criteria. 
The Army did not have savings data specific to CEM. They assumed the savings would be 
similar to other MYP programs of ten to twelve percent. Significant savings had already been 
achieved through a dual-source acquisition strategy. 
d. Ml Tank 
. . 
MYPs were submitted for the chassis, engine and Fire Control System Thermal 
Imaging System for the Ml tank. The analysis indicated savings realism and design stability did 
not clearly meet the legislated criteria. 
(1) Ml Tank Chassis. The Army's savings were based on one of the contractor's 
two plants being funded by DOD for closing. The Army counted on savings to occur from 
reduced overhead rates. The House Armed Services Committee recently proposed deleting the 
funding required for closure of the second plant, thus putting the potential savings at risk. The 
Army plans to upgrade the M 1 tank in 1992. This upgrade would be only half way through 
planned production. This does not qualify as stable design. 
(2) M 1 Tank Engine. The Army estimates were based on actual data, but for a 
different quantity. Contractor estimates were not requested. Savings rates were based on a ratio 
between historical and projected multiyear contract savings for the tank chassis instead of the 
engine. Increased weight put excess stress on the recuperator, which led to an increased failure 
rate. It was projected to be two years until an improvement was tested and produced. 
(3) M 1 Tank Fire Control System Thermal Imaging System. The Army did not 
get detailed contractor estimates. They only utilized an overall contractor estimate of the 
relationship between annual and MYP costs to generate the savings rate. 
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e. Bradley Fighting Vehicle 
This program was submitted as two programs, integration and TOW -2. Both of these 
programs met all criteria. 
f. Palletized Load System (PLS) 
The analysis indicated savings realism and requirement, funding and design stability, 
all did not clearly meet the legislated criteria. The PLS did not have any production history. 
Cost estimates were based on a similarly designed truck known as the Heavy Expanded Mobility 
Tactical Truck (HEMTT). Funding was not stable because the program was only in the Research 
and Development phase, thus production funding had not yet been appropriated. Although the 
PLS used non-developmental item (NDI) components, the integration of these items was still 
risky. Legislation required a contract to be awarded by December 1989, but the Army requested 
an extension until after testing was completed. 
g. FIA 18 Hornet 
The analysis indicated stability of requirement and funding did not clearly meet the 
legislated criteria. Navy and the House Armed Services Committee projected a possible surplus 
ofF/A 18s in the middle 1990s. Budget constraints have forced the Navy to reduce future 
production quantities. 
h. E-2C Hawkeye 
The analysis indicated stability of requirement and design as not clearly meeting the 
legislated criteria. A June 1989 Congressional Research Service study projected a surplus ofE-
2C aircraft by the middle 1990s. The Navy projects the surplus from 1992-1994. Recent Group I 
and IT upgrades have not yet been tested. The final integration of the extremely technical 
avionics of the E-2Cwas perceived to be uncertain. Wing fatigue problems of the current design 
are still undergoing testing. (Ref. Ill: pp.9-23) 
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4. Procurement: Assessment of DOD's Multiyear Contract Candidates for 
Fiscal Year 1991, August 1990 
This report was an assessment of six MYP candidates, which DOD had submitted within 
the Fiscal Year 1991 President's Budget, to determine whether they meet the legislated criteria 
forMYP. 
Table 3.C.3 
System DOD Est. Realism of Requirement Funding Design 
MYPSavings Savings Stability Stability Stability 
Percent 
BlackHawk 12.4 ? ? ? 
FMTV 12.9 ? ? 
Avenger 9.3 ? ? ? 
LHD 7.6 ? ? ? 
LCAC 7.7 ? 
GPS 19.8 ? ? 
Table Code: "?" signifies same meaning as in Table 3.C.1. 
The following will be a brief summary of the most significant parts of GAO's analyses of 
the MYP candidates that are summarized in Table 3.C.3: 
a. UH-60 Black Hawk Helicopter 
The GAO found that the savings realism, requirement stability and funding 
stability did not clearly satisfy the legislative requirements, Annual and multiyear cost estimates 
were based on the assumption that the relationship between multiyear and annual contract costs 
which existed in 1984, existed at the current time, which was six years later. "No data was 
available to support the $136 million savings in materials the Army attributed to the mUltiyear 
contract. " The Army had not asked for new proposals. The stability of funding and requirement 
were very closely linked. The proposed contract was for 300 aircraft. The procurement 
objective was 2,253 aircraft. The Army was currently developing an Army Aviation 
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Modernization Plan to reflect drawing down personnel and aircraft numbers. The Program 
Executive Officer (PEO) stated that "the service cannot rationally review the procurement I 
objective until its modernization plan was revised because the size and needs of the force 
structure will determine the size of all Army aviation programs." The Army's Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for Research, Development, and Acquisition said the procurement objective would be 
reduced by as much as.632 aircraft. The Secretary of Defense said the UH-60 program may be 
terminated altogether. Taken together, this does not present a picture of a stable requirement. 
The Army did not request UH-60 funding beyond fiscal year 1992, while the MYP duration was 
proposed from fiscal year 1992 to 1996. 
b. Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV) 
The report found that the savings realism and design stability did not clearly 
. satisfy the legislative criteria. Price history does not exist for this program. The Army based its 
estimates on past similar four-wheeled truck programs and adjusted for configuration differences 
and inflation. Contractors proposals were due to be received in October 1990. The FMTV had 
not yet been produced. Despite this shortfall, the Army felt the design risk was low because the 
FMTV was essentially a commercial item, manufacturing processes existed and because each 
model would be prototyped. On the contrary, GAO believed that the design was not stable 
because of the uncertainty pertaining to component integration. 
c. Avenger Weapon System 
GAO found that the savings realism, funding stability, and design stability did 
not clearly satisfy the legislated criteria. The cost estimates submitted in the justification 
package were based on outdated 1988 data. The contractor, Boeing, and the program office 
stated that the estimates were too low. In July 1990, Boeing proposed a not-to-exceed price that 
was twelve percent higher than the justification price, but claimed that their price would fall as 
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prices came in from their subcontractors. This revised data were not submitted to Congress. In 
light of the increasing prices, DOD would not be able to fund the desired quantities with 
budgeted funds. The design of the Avenger as a stand-alone system, commonly known as the 
stinger missile system, was proven. The problem was that one of the essential performance 
criteria of the Avenger Weapon System was the integration with the Forward Area Air Defense 
System (F AADS). Other elements of F AADS are not projected to be ready for fielding until as 
late as 1998 which was long after the contract award date. 
d. LHD Amphibious ships 
GAO's assessment concluded that the savings realism, requirement stability and 
funding stability did not clearly satisfy the legislated requirements. This MYP candidate was to 
build LHDs 5 through 7. The Navy based its cost estimates on actual data from LHDs 1 through 
. 4. The problem was that the contract had not yet been solicited. There were many variables that 
were not well defined such as savings, future requirement and future funding, in addition to the 
determination of which contractor would win the award. The request for proposal was due for 
release in October of 1990. MYP authority was granted for LHDs 2 through 4. When the firm 
cost data were finally available, the MYP savings did not materialize, thus annual contracts were 
used. The Naval Sea Systems Command (NA VSEA) stated the Navy's requirement was for ten 
LHDs. GAO said NA VSEA's reference, the Department of the Navy Long Term Amphibious 
Lift Requirement and Optimum Ship Mix Study of 1983, was out of date. A new amphibious 
ship manpower and assets study, which was then in the hands of the Secretary of Defense 
(SECDEF), defined the LHD requirement as between seven and nine ships. A 1989 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) study reported several alternatives to continuing with the 
production of the LHD class ships. GAO could not de~ermine if LHDs 6 and 7 were included in 
36 
the 1992 Program Objective Memorandum (POM). DOD officials did not comment on this 
incongruity of funding plans. 
e. Landing Craft, Air Cushion (LCAC) Boats 
GAO's assessment concluded that the LCAC's requirement stability did not 
clearly satisfy the legislated criteria. The Navy's claim was that the current LCAC requirement 
was for a quantity of 107, but GAO points out it was based on the outdated seven year old 
amphibious lift study from 1983. The update to this study was currently with the SECDEF, but 
had not yet been released. GAO believed that the requirement for LCAC was proportional to the 
number of well-deck ships (LHDs, LHAs, LPDs) and the size of the Marine Corps. Based on 
that relation, the seven-year-old requirement would no longer be valid . 
. f. NA VSTAR Global Positioning System (GPS) Block IIR Replenishment 
Satellites 
The GAO report concluded that the requirement and design stability did not 
clearly satisfy the legislated criteria. GAO felt that the Air Force was being too conservative in 
their estimates for existing satellite life span. The Air Force justified that they would rather keep 
a few satellites in storage, than run out of the long lead time system. General Electric had been 
awarded the development and production contract for this updated satellite. Development would 
continue during the early phases of production. General Electric had not produced this series of 
satellites, although they had produced other satellites. A critical design review was scheduled for 
August 1990. The GPS program office believed that because of the contractor's experience in 
the satellite business, design risk was low. GAO believed that since development would still be 
in progress during early stages of production and that some design risk still existed in the Air 
Force's strategy, that the GPS program did not clearly meet the stable design criteria. (Ref. 109: 
pp.2-33) 
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5. C-17 Aircraft: Comments on Air Force Request for Approval of Multiyear 
Procurement Authority, March 1996 
At the time of this report, McDonnell Douglas ha? not yet presented their proposal to the 
Air Force. The MYP request was not proposed in the President's Budget which is the normal 
procedure. The proposal was to expire on June 1, 1996. 
The Air Force's preliminary estimates indicate MYP would save approximately $896 
million over annual production contracts. GAO believed the savings would be much lower at 
about $300 million. 
GAO perceived several problems in the criteria of design stability. Several unresolved 
design problems existed which could result in future engineering changes. Furthermore, the Air 
Force had identified approximately $1 billion in research and development funding which will be 
required to develop near term engineering. change proposals and $1.8 billion to implement ~hem. 
These changes were projected for the 1997 through 2004 timeframe. GAO arrived at the 
conclusion that the C-17 was 18 months away from achieving all of its required specifications. 
GAO also believe~ the requirement quantity was not stable. The Defense Acquisition 
Board (DAB) decided to procure 120 C-17s. GAO believed that 100 would satisfy the current 
strategic mobility requirements. 
The report stated that the projected savings rate was on the low side of the spectrum. 
Typically Congress likes to see a minimum of 10 percent savings rate. 
The following were GAO's final conclusions: 
Overall, we believe some savings could be achieved from a multiyear 
procurement of the C-17. However, the savings will likely be less than the 
current $896 million estimate and will entail both costs and risks. Given the 
uncertainty regarding the design stability and the risk associated with 
increasing production, we believe a further assessment of the merits of a 
C-17 mUltiyear program may be warranted and can be accommodated under 
the current proposal. (Ref. 106.) 
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6. ARMY ACQUISITION: Javelin Is Not Ready for Multiyear Procurement, 
September 1996 
This report was an analysis of whether the Javelin weapon system satisfied the legislative 
criteria for MYP. The GAO believed the most significant reason why the Javelin was not ready 
for MYP was that the Army has not proven design stability. Tests had not demonstrated that the 
production items would satisfy performance requirements. Javelin tests conducted at that time 
demonstrated the need for additional design changes. During 1996 there were several production 
line stoppages while engineering changes were developed. GAO believed that the javelin's 
entering MYP before achieving successful test results would greatly increase the risk of cost 
overruns and schedule delays. This added risk could more than offset savings ofMYP. GAO 
concluded that the Army should award an annual Javelin contract and only consider MYP once 
the design was stable. (Ref. 105) 
7. APACHE LONGBOW HELICOPTER, Fire Control Radar Not Ready for 
Multiyear Procurement, November 1997 
This report was an analysis of issues relating to the Apache longbow helicopter's fire 
,control radar, which had been proposed by the AnTIY and DOD for MYP. GAO found that the 
statutory requirement of stable design had not been satisfied. Specifically, the radar's 
transmitter, a critical component, was in progress of being redesigned. The transmitter had 
development problems, which lead to several delayed progress tests. Army officials projected 
that operational testing would not occur until December 1998 or early 1999. The Army stated 
they could utilize the transmitter that was currently being fielded, until the new one passed 
operational test and evaluation. GAO did not believe this reasoning was sound and consistent 
with the statutory requirements of design stability. (Ref. 104) 
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Chapter III has presented the basic data for this thesis. Section B provided the approval 
record for every MYP request submitted by the DOD from fiscal year 1982 through 1999. It also 
displayed the DOD's estimates for the estimated TOA savings of each program that was 
approved and awarded a mUltiyear contract. Section C provided GAO MYP assessments that will 
be used as an objective benchmark. Chapter N analyzes the data presented in this chapter to 
answer the questions proposed in Chapter 1. This analysis will include comparing the approval 
record against the objective benchmark of the GAO reports. It will evaluate the cancellation risk 
associated with MYPs. It will also analyze how MYP legislation has evolved in an acquisition 
reform environment and if the MYP record has provided the basis for further reforms. 
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IV. DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter focuses on analyzing key issues associated with the thesis questions. The 
analysis focuses on the following core issues: 
-What are the primary causes for Congress' approval/disapproval decision of DOD MYP 
requests? 
-What has the historical record demonstrated about how much cancellation risk is 
associated with DOD MYP? 
-Has the MYP approval legislation evolved consistently with recent acquisition reform 
initiatives? 
-Does the historical record support the amount of control that Congress exerts over DOD 
in the MYP approval process? 
-What has been the recent Congressional focuses on disapproval of MYP requests? 
B. PRIMARY CAUSES FOR MYP APPROVALIDISAPPROVAL 
The first groups of issues to be analyzed are associated with the Congressional 
approval/rejection rational for DOD MYP requests. Sub-issues include the primary causes for 
MYP approval/rejection and whether Congress and DOD have adhered to the stated MYP 
criteria? 
1. Methodology and Selected Data Presentation 
The following methodology is used for this analysis: First, the GAO MYP assessments 
summary charts were matched to their associated Congressional approval or disapproval 
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decision. GAO assessments were utilized because they are considered to be objective 
assessments of the suitability of candidates for MYP. Second, the GAO assessments were sorted 
by Congressional approval ~r disapproval in Tables 4.B.l and 4B.2 respectively. Third, each 
column was summed to determine the fraction and percentage of MYP requests that did not 
clearly satisfy the legislated criteria. Estimated savings less than ten percent were considered as 
not meeting the criteria in accordance with the legislation that existed at that time. These data 
are located on the bottom two rows of Tables 4.B.l and 4.B.2. Fourth, each row was summed to 
determine how many criteria did not clearly meet the M'YP legislated requirements for each 
program. This is the right hand column of Tables 4.B.l and 4.B.2. Fifth, the total columns from 
step three were summed to determine a factor, which represents how well GAO believed the 
MYP request met the stated MYP approval criteria. The number specifically represents how 
many of the MYP criteria were not clearly satisfied per GAO's assessment. This Figure is in the 
bottom right comer of Tables 4.B.l and 4.B.2. For this program sum, a larger number represents 
failing to clearly meet more criteria and thus being a weaker candidate than a proposal with a 
lower program sum. Contrarily, a smaller program sum represents meeting a larger number of 
stated MYP criteria and therefore being a relative!y stronger MYP candidate. 
The specific MYP requests that are analyzed are the GAO MYP assessments, which were 
presented in Chapter III, section C. The GAO recommendations are compared to the 
Congressional approval/disapproval decisions that were also provided in Chapter III, section B. 
Tables 4.B.l and 4.B.2 present summaries of the approved and the disapproved MYP requests 
and the associated specific GAO criteria assessments. Table 4.B.3 provides the comparative 




MYP Requests Approved with GAO Reports in the Same Year 
System Fiscal Est.MYP Realism of Requirement 
Year Savings Savings Stability 
F-16 Aircraft 1982 7.7% Not in report Not.in report 
CH-47D 1989 l3.2% ? 
H-60 Engine 1989 12.2% ? ? 
MLRS 1989 11.4 % ? 
AV-8B 1989 11.9 % ? 
UHF Satellite 1989 11.5 % ? 
DMSP 1989 18.1 % ? 
F-16 Aircraft 1989 5.7% ? ? 
Maverick 1990 12.3 % ? 
M1 Tank 1990 10.9% ? 
Bradley 1990 12.5 % 
PLS 1990 12.7 % ? ? 
FMTV 1991 12.9 %. ? 
Avenger 1991 9.3 % ? 
LHD 1991 7.6% ? ? 
LCAC 1991 7.7% ? 
GPS 1991 19.8 % ? 
C-17 Aircraft 1996 5.2% ? ? 
Fraction of 6/18 12/18 9/18 
requests with 
questions in this 
criterion 
Decimal .33 .66 .5 
Equivalent 
Table 4.B.l 
"?" annotates criteria that do not clearly meet the legislated requirements. 
Funding Design 
Stability Stability 









































MYP Requests Not Approved with GAO Reports in the Same Year 
System - Fiscal Est. MYP Realism of Requirement Funding Design Fraction of Criteria 
Year Savings Savi.ngs Stability Stability Stability Not Clearly Meeting 
Requirements 
KC-135 Re-engine 1990 13.0% ? 1/5 
Combined Effect Munition 1990 10.0% ? 1/5 
F/ A 18 Hornet Aircraft 1990 5.5 % ? ? 3/5 
E-2C Hawkeye Aircraft 1990 13.6% , ? ? 2/5 
UH-60 Blackhawk 1991 12.4% ? ? ? 3/5 
Fraction of requests with 1/5 3/5 3/5 2/5 - 1/5 10/5 
questions in this criteria 
Decimal Equivalent .2 .6 .6 .2 .2 2.0 I 
----- ---- --
Table 4.B.2 
Note: The Apache Longbow radar and the Javelin are not analyzed-because the Congressional decision was not made in the same year as 
the GAO report. The situation may have changed from the GAO report until the decision was made. Any conclusions from these data 
would be inconclusive. 
Comparison of Summaries of Approved and Disapproved MYP Requests by Criteria Per Request 
Average Average Average Average A verage Design Average Total 
Estimated MYP Realism of Requirement Funding Stability Number of 
Savings Savings Stability Stability Criterion Not Criteria Not 
Criterion Not Criterion Not Criterion Not Criterion Not Clearly Meeting Clearly 
Clearly Meeting Clearly Meeting Clearly Meeting Clearly Meeting Requirements Meeting 
Requirements Requirements Requirements Requirements Requirements 
Approved MYPs .33 .67 .5 .33 .33 2.16 
{)i~?j)lJroved MYPs .2 .6 .6 .2 .2 2.0 
Table 4.B.3 
This table represents the proportion of approved or disapproved MYP requests that did not clearly meet the legislated criteria for MYP. 
2. Do All Approved Programs Meet Legislated Criteria? 
The first issue to be considered is whether Congress only approves MYP requests that 
clearly meet the legal criteria. The data in Table 4.B.l demonstrate that this is clearly not the 
case. The PLS, LHD amphibious ship and C-17 aircraft each have four of five criteria that do 
not clearly meet the legislated criteria. Additionally, the F-16 aircraft has three of five criteria 
that do not clearly meet the MYP criteria. 
The PLS MYP request was deficient in four criteria. The program was only in the 
Research and Development phase. This point in the PLS life cycle is too early to apply for 
MYP. The program has not had the opportunity to attain funding, design, or requirement 
stability. Cost estimates could not be attained for the MYP because the program was not ready 
to begin production. Historically, trucks have been one of the traditional mainstays of DOD 
MYP. The researcher believes the PLS would eventually evolve into a good MYP candidate, but 
it was requested and approved too early in its life cycle. Since the Army was directed via 
legislation to enter into a mUltiyear contract by Congress, the researcher assumes there must have 
been some reason besides the standard criteria for the PLS to enter MYP. 
The LHD amphibious ship program was requested for MYP in fiscal Year 1991. The 
GAO assessment from Chapter ill stated that the request did not clearly satisfy four of the 
legislated criteria for MYP. The Navy proposed a savings rate of 7.6 percent, which was well 
below the legislated minimum rate of 12 percent. Additionally, GAO challenged the realism of 
these substandard savings because the savings were based on actual figures from annual 
contracts. The Navy did not have mUltiyear cost data from the contractor. The Navy estimated 
both the mUltiyear and the annual costs to arrive at the estimated savings. The Navy intended to 
require both multiyear and annual contract proposals from the contractor when the request for 
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proposal was posted. The future requirement for amphibious ships was in the midst of potential 
change. GAO felt that this revision of future requirements was fundamental to the 
recommendation that the requirement was not clearly stable. GAO also believed the funding was 
not stable because the funding could not be identified in the Navy's fiscal year 1992 POM. It is 
evident by r~viewing successful MYPs historically, shipbuilding contracts with this few 
production units have not been a program profile that has utilized mUltiyear procurement. The 
rationale is that acquiring relatively low quantities of ships does not allow the shipbuilders to 
take advantage of EOQ buys that represent a majority of the MYP savings. The researcher 
believes that four of five criteria not meeting legislated requirements, combined with the 
historical record which does not support ships in low production quan"tities entering MYP, makes 
the LHD a poor candidate for MYP. The researcher does not agree with Congress and believes 
mUltiyear authority should not have been granted to the LHD amphibious ship program. 
In fiscal year 1996, the C-17 aircraft program was proposed to Congress as an out-of-
cycle request. Out-of-cycle infers that the request was submitted at a time other than with the 
President's Budget. In the spring of 1996, the C-17 program was hurried through Congress. 
The GAO assessment of the C-17 program dated March 28, 1996, stated that four of the criteria 
for multiyear requirements were not clearly satisfied on the C-17 program request. The design 
was not stable as demonstrated by the Air Force budgeting funds for implementing numerous 
near term engineering change proposals. The historical average savings rate for successful MYP 
programs provided in Table 4.B.1 excluding the C-17 was 10.67 percent. The savings rate that 
was initially proposed for the C-17 at five percent does not come close to the historical concept 
of substantial savings. GAO stated that the substandard savings rate was not realistic, that the 
savings were nearly one third of what the Air Force proposed. The requirement was not totally 
stable. The DAB authorized acquiring 120 C-17s. GAO believed 100 would satisfy the 
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requirement. This requirement difference is a minor issue, which can be solved by considering 
option years for additional quantities. The bottom line for the requirement is that the Air Force 
will buy a large quantity ofC-17s to satisfy the future DOD airlift requirement. Despite this, the 
, 
factors of cost savings, cost reliability and design stability, combine to present a program that 
clearly does not meet the legislated intent for MYP authority. 
The F-16 aircraft MYP request was deficient in three areas. The F-16 was in the final 
year of a mUltiyear contract. The problems were in the areas of cost savings and future 
requirements. The proposed savings were only 5.7 percent, which was well below the then 
current criterion of ten percent. The confidence that this figure was a true saving over annual 
contracts was low because the annual estimates were based on Air Force estimates instead of a 
contractor proposal. Requirement estimates ranged from quantities of 400 to 630. This great 
variation in quantity opened the Air Force to potential costly contract modifications as they 
increase or decrease quantities. The F-16 program should have resolved two issues before 
applying for MYP authority. First, the Air Force needed to attain estimates from the contractor 
for annual and mUltiyear contracts. Second, all stakeholders should have been involved in the 
requirement process to solidify their requirements. Correction of these two deficient criteria 
would have changed the ratio to one criterion that did not clearly satisfy the legislated criteria to 
. four criteria that clearly meets the legislated standards. In this case, if only one criterion had not 
clearly met the requirements compared to the average number of criteria not clearly meeting the 
requirements of approved awarded MYPs of 2.17 (from Table 4.B.l), the C-17 would have been 
a far better candidate than the average successful MYP. If these actions were completed, the 
whole F-16 package would be strong enough to balance out for the deficient savings rate and be 
worthy of MYP approval. 
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The MYP legislation provided in Chapter IT does not mention tradeoffs, but they do exist. 
The criteria for savings, savings realism, requirement, funding stability and design stability seem 
fairly straightforward at first reading. Upon closer examination, it becomes evident that there is 
a gray area when a program is very close, if not satisfying the criteria. This is where GAO has 
stated tradeoffs apply. When one criterion is a bit weak, it will need another criterion to be 
strong enough to balance out for the added risk associated with this gray area. (Ref. 111: p.2) 
The researcher does not believe that when three or four of the five main criteria are in the gray 
area, like the examples from the previous section, that there is enough good in the remaining 
criteria to make the whole program worthy of MYP approval. 
The counter to the position that Congress has approved programs that are not worthy of 
MYP approval is that DOD has submitted MYP requests, which do not meet the criteria. In fact, 
. there are several programs that the DOD has proposed and Congress has not approved, which did 
not meet the criteria. The Carlucci push for increased MYPs in fiscal year 1990 is an excellent 
example of this. The blame for MYP approval of programs that are not qualified should fall frrst 
on the DOD. It is the DOD, which must first request authorization for a program to enter into 
MYP. 
Upon reviewing the PLS, LHD, C-17 and the F-16 examples described above, it is clear 
that there have been cases when Congress, as well as the DOD have deviated from the legislated 
MYP criteria. This is not to say that the Congressional approval decision was a bad one, for 
there are other reasons including industrial base, economic revival and program stability 
concerns which may have taken precedence. MYP may have been the mechanism utilized to 
attempt to achieve these goals. Congress must have believed that the benefits of MYP in these 
situations were greater than the risks associated with approving weaker requests. 
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3. What are the Primary Causes of ApprovallRejection? 
The next issue to be analyzed is to determine the primary causes for MYP 
approval/rejection. Upon review of the data from Tables,4.B.1, 4.B.2 and 4.B.3, it is apparent 
that the data are not conclusive. Within each MYP criterion, the percentage of programs not 
clearly meeting the criteria that were approved, compared to the programs that were disapproved, 
were very similar. Thus, it is inconclusive to come to a determination as to which criteria are 
most significant to Congress' approval/disapproval decision. In fact, the average of the requests 
that do not clearly satisfy the criteria for programs that are disapproved (2.0) is lower than for 
approved MYPs (2.16). This result is counter-intuitive. It demonstrates that based on the GAO 
assessments, the MYP requests, which were not approved, were rated slightly higher than 
approved MYP programs. The data conservatively demonstrate that the candidates, which were 
approved, were not clearly superior to the, disapproved candidates and that there may be other 
reasons than the stated criteria for the approval/disapproval decision rationale. 
There were two cases in 1990 that warrant discussion. The KC-135 re-engine program 
and the Combined Effects Munition (CEM) program only had one criterion each that did not 
clearly satisfy MYP criteria. That lone criterion was realism of savings. The political and fiscal 
environments were in great upheaval at that time. The Soviet threat was diminishing and 
decreased DOD budgets could be foreseen. In an effort to lock in to long term security and 
stability for their programs, under the guidance of Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci, DOD 
submitted an astounding 35 MYP requests that year. A Pentagon official stated that many of 
these requests were not valid MYP candidates. (Ref. 67) Secretary Carlucci made the following 
statement supporting additional use of MYP: 
You can chase all the hammers and screwdrivers that you want and you'll 
get some savings there, but it's dwarfed by the amount of waste that is 
created by the fundamental instability in the process and the hostile 
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relationship that has grown up between the Defense Department and 
Congress on one hand and the defense contractors on the other. (Ref. 3) 
At the same time, Congress as well as the Services, did not want to lock in too many 
MYPs due to the uncertain future threat and concern over reducing future budgeting flexibility~ 
As a result, Congress was very strict, particularly on realism of savings rates. (Ref. 114) Under 
different financial circumstances, both the KC-135 re-engine and the CEM programs probably 
would have been approved. 
It is apparent to the researcher that Congress as well as the DOD, has not strictly adhered 
to the legislated MYP approval criteria. Four of the 18 programs that were analyzed and 
approved should not have been approved. Two of the five programs that were analyzed and 
rejected seemed to be good MYP candidates worthy of approval. The overall ratings of 
candidates from this analysis that were rejected actually had a slightly higher rating than the 
candidates that were approved. Furthermore, there is not conclusive data that any criteria are 
more important to candidate approval or disapproval. This leads the researcher to believe that 
there are other reasons, outside of the stated criteria that are influential on the Congressional 
MYP approval decision. 
C. MULTIYEAR PROCUREMENT CANCELLATION RISK 
It is commonly known that one of the primary deterrents to increased use of MYP is fear 
of the risk of contract termination and being forced to pay cancellation charges. The point of this 
analysis is to evaluate this cancellation risk. This analysis focuses on identifying which MYP 
contracts have been terminated and what, if any, cancellation charges were paid. These charges 
are then compared to the estimated financial benefits of the MYPs that have been carried out to 
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completion during this same period to determine the relative financial risk associated with MYP 
contract termination. 
There were three MYPs that were terminated between fiscal years 1982 and 1998. The 
first was the termination of the MK -46 torpedo program. This MYP was terminated one year 
early due to commencement of production for the follow-on MK-50 torpedo. There were not any 
cancellation charges, but the full projected savings of the MYP were probably not achieved. The 
second was the termination of the Hawk Missile program. This termination resulted in 
cancellation charges of $13 million. The third termination was the Family of Medium Tactical 
Vehicles (FMTV) program. In this case, the last year of a five-year contract was not funded at 
the total quantity. There were not any cancellation charges associated with this termination. In 
summary, there were three terminations over 18 years with a grand total of $13 million in 
cancellation charges. (Refs. 109: p. 4 and 9) 
The total estimated TOA MYP savings that were identified in Table 3.B.l were $11.45 
billion. From a purely financial perspective, comparing the total estimated benefit ofthe MYPs 
of $11.45 billion to the total cost of cancellation charges of $13 million, yields a total estimated 
benefit that is approximately 881 times the total costs. This tremendous disparity between the 
financial benefits and costs of MYP makes it apparent that the cancellation charge risk is 
minimal under the current DOD and Congress relationship. The scrutiny by both Congress and 
DOD led to a nearly perfect record of entering MYPs that were not canceled. 
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D. MULTIYEAR PROCUREl\1ENT LEGISLATION IN AN ACQUISITION REFORM 
ENVIRONl\1ENT 
This section focuses on analyzing whether Congress has altered MYP legislation 
consistently with recent acquisition reform initiatives. The background of acquisition reform 
was presented in Chapter II. The following table represents the significant Congressional MYP 
reporting requirements, and how they have changed, from fiscal years 1989 through 1999. 
Upon review of Table 4.D.l, it is apparent that there have only been two significant 
modifications to DOD MYP Congressional requirements. 
The first change in legislation is the evolution of the savings requirement rates for MYP 
versus a series of annual contracts. The Fiscal Year 1989 National Security Authorization Act 
legislated that the savings requirement for MYPs would be ten percent compared to the cost of 
current negotiated contracts adjusted for changes in quantity and inflation or twelve percent 
savings, compared to annual contracts if no recent experience exists. The Fiscal Year 1990 
National Security Authorization Act reduced the savings requirement from twelve to ten percent 
for contracts, which did not have recent data. The Fiscal Year 1991 Authorization Act replaced 
the numeric savings requirement with the adjective description of I~substantial" savings. 
Although these acts of legislation all occurred before acquisition reform was in full swing 
in the middle 1990s, this is an excellent example of the early stages of true acquisition reform. 
The change oftwelve percent to ten percent to "substantial" represents Congress giving DOD 
increased flexibility to make the wise business decision by requesting MYP when the situation 
was appropriate. The reasoning was that there were certain large programs, which could not 




DOD Multiyear Procurement 
Congressional Reporting Requirement Highlights for Fiscal Years 1989 - 1999 
FY 1989 FY 1990 FY 1991- FY 1994 - FY 1997 FY 1998 - FY 1999 
FY 1993 
I 
Cancellation Cancellation Ceiling> No Change No Change No Change No Change 
Ceiling $ 100M, written 
Requirements notification 30 days prior 
to contract award 
Full funding and OSD must certify to No Change No Change No Change No Change MYPs 
mhiimum Congress full funding 
economic and minimum economic 
production rate production rates for 
certification Authorized MYPs 
Contract value >$500M contract value No Change No Change . No Change >$500M contract value 
approval requires only specifically requires 
requirements Appropriation Appropriation and 
"other than 
- Appropriation II 
EOQ, Unfunded >20M EOQ procurement, No Change No Change No Change No Change 
Contingent unfunded contingent ' 
liability, adv liability or advance 
procurement procurement leading to 
requirements MYP requires 
Congressional 
notification 30 days prior 
to contract award 
Termination DOD may not terminate No Change No Change No Change No Change 
requirements a MYP without 
notification to Congress 




DOD Multiyear Procurement 
Congressional Reporting Requirement Highlights for Fiscal Years 1989 - 1999 (Continued) 
FY 1989 FY 1990 FY 1991-FY FY 1994 FY 1998-
1993 -FY FY 1999 
1997 . 
Saving 10 % compared to cost of 10 % compared to cost of Substantial No Change No Change 
Requirement current negotiated contracts current negotiated contracts Savings of the 
s Compared adjusted for changes in adjusted for changes in total 
to Annual quantity and inflation or 12 % quantity and inflation or 10 % anticipated 
Procurement savings compared to annual savings compared to annual costs of 
contracts if no recent contracts if no recent carrying out 




Table 4.0.1 (Cont.) 
(Refs. 29-41,82-92, 112: 2306(h) and 112: 2306) 
value, the actual dollar savings were quite large and therefore worthwhile of consideration for 
MYP. 
The question arises as to how are "substantial" savings defined. The answer is, it 
depends on several factors. The criterion was for twelve percent, then ten percent and then 
substantial savings. The impression is that Congress still wants a minimum ten percent savings, 
unless there are strong reasons in the other criteria or in some factor outside of the legislated 
criteria. (Ref. 67) Again,· the C-17 is an excellent example. Congress specifically legislated that 
the C-17 MYP must achieve greater than five percent savings. (Ref. 52) Defense appropriation 
subcommittee chairman Representative Bill Young (R-Florida) stated that the subcommittee 
approved the bill contingent upon achieving savings of greater than five percent. (Ref. 2) He 
also stated he would like to get it up to about seven and one half percent. (Ref. 23) A factor 
which could balance out for this low saving rate was that it was projected this contract would 
bring more than 18,000 jobs to the State of California. (Ref. 26) Additionally, 1996 was a 
Presidential electioI! year and the State of California had 54 electoral votes, the greatest number 
of any state. (Ref. 74) The voting populace of California would undoubtedly see the President in 
better standing if this contract were approved. There is also the factor that due to the immense 
size of the contract, even though the savings were just greater than five percent, the total savings 
were initially projected at $834.8 million and were revised to be $1.03 billion by utilizing MYP. 
(Ref. 25) This is a great amount of funding that is worthy of allowing a reduced savings rate. 
The issue fundamentally boils down to that the word substantial saving allows Congress and 
DOD to use good business sense, to apply tradeoffs to the MYP process and to use MYPs when 
it seems best for the Country. 
The second significant change to MYP legislation is the codifying of the requirement for 
the MYP request to be legislated in an Appropriation Act and an "other than an Appropriations 
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Act". (Ref. 91) Since this legislation was part of the National Defense Authorization Act of 
. 1998, it is assumed that this statement infers that the MYP must also come from an 
Authorization Act. This legislation and the associated in~erence may seem to be a redundant 
statement of the basic relationship between the Congressional Authorization and Appropriation 
Committees, but actually it is not. It is reinforcing the relationship between the Appropriators 
and the Authorizers. It is usually not legislated that a program must be authorized before it is 
appropriated, but this has been a Congressional rule. (Ref. 1) For some areas it has been made 
into statute that a program must first be authorized, before it can be appropriated. Now MYP 
falls in this category. It has been speculated within DOD that the reason for this legislation 
change was due to the C-17 Aircraft program. The C-17 was appropriated to enter MYP by the 
Fiscal Year 1996 Supplementary Defense Appropriation Act. The Act stated that the funds 
appropriated under this Act for the C-17,· 
... may not be used to execute a multiyear procurement contract until the 
earlier of (1) May 24, 1996, or (2) the day after the date of the enactment of 
an Act that contains a provision authorizing the Department of Defense to 
enter into a mUltiyear contract for the C-17 aircraft program." (Ref. 52) 
This legislation, which was dated April 26, 1996, essentially took a great amount of power away 
from the Authorizing committees. If the Authorizers passed a bill, then the C-17 MYP would go 
on. On the other hand, if they did not pass an Authorization bill, the C-17 MYP could legally 
still go on. It would break a congressional rule, but it would be legal. This made for a very 
politically sensitive situation for DOD as well as Congress. Being left out of the decision on 
such ~ l)1ajor program was counter to the fundamentals of Congressional checks and balances. 
(Refs. 1,67 and 71) 
Even though this new l~gislation is only emphasizing the relationship that is supposed to 
exist between the Appropriators and the Authorizers, it is counter to the fundamentals of 
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acquisition reform. One of the principles of acquisition reform is streamlining the acquisition 
process. The C-17 was a program that was having difficulties throughout the late 1980s and 
early 1990s. (Ref. 105) Congress and DOD worked together outside the normal MYP request 
timeframes to utilize MYP as a method of attaining program stability. The bold legislation by 
the Congressional Appropriators and then all of Congress, used streamlining to move the C-17 
MYP request through Congress much faster than the normal procedures. This allowed the Air 
Force to have the MYP approval process be closely in sync with the acquisition process. It is 
normally very difficult for the acquisition cycle and the MYP approval process to be ready to 
enter into MYP at the same time. The acquisition cycle is on a schedule that is changing as 
milestones are met. The MYP approval process is usually on a rigid schedule that is not easily 
adjusted to the optimal time when the program is ready for MYP. The C-17 case in 1996 
resulted in MYP approval when DOD and Congress both believed the program was ready for 
MYP. This was very effective and efficient interaction of the MYP approval process and the 
acquisition cycle. 
This is an interesting break from the standard MYP situation. Typically, stability of 
design,. funding and requirement are needed prior to entering MYP. But it can be reasoned that 
entering MYP will provide stability to the program. This is so because once a program enters 
into a MYP, due to the threat of cancellation charges, the holders of the purse strings, do not 
want to alter the MYP program. In the case of an annually funded contract, requirements and 
funding are scrutinized every year, often leading to program changes and instability. (Ref. 70) 
As mentioned above, this MYP stability was an effective tool leading the C-17 program to 
success. 
One area of legislation that has been omitted by Congress is the indexing of key numeric 
values. By not indexing these figures, the inflation of the United States dollar has tightened the 
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Congressional control over MYP. The specific numbers are the $100 million cancellation 
ceiling, the $500 million contract value and the $20 million EOQ savings, which are identified in 
Figure 4.D.l. The consumer price index (Cpn has been utilized in this analysis as the index 
factor. (Ref. 55: p. 349 and 61) The following table represents what the value of the original 
Congressional intent would be inflated to in current 1998 dollars. 
Date Initially Future Value Value in 
Thresholds L~gislated Calculation Using CPI September, 1998 
$100M Dec 1981 (Ref. 82 ) $100Ml90.9 x 163.6 $180.0M 
$20M Dec 1982 (Ref. 30) $20/96.5 x 163.6 $33.9M 
$500M Dec 1985 (Ref. 32) $500Ml107.6 x 163.6 $760.2M 
Table 4.D.2 
The cancellation ceiling notification requirement, which was initially legislated at $100 
million in 1981, is now equivalent to $180.0 million in September 1998 dollars. The $20 million 
EOQ buy requirement that was initially legislated in 1982 is equivalent to $33.9 million in 1998 
dollars. The $500 million contract value originally enacted into law in 1985 is now equal to 
$760.2 million in 1998 dollars. These data demonstrate that the level of control that Congress 
wanted to·have over the DOD MYP process when they initially legislated these thresholds has 
increased greatly over the years. This increased Congressional control is caused by inflation of 
the United States' currency and Congress' not indexing these thresholds to maintain the same 
level of control. The DOD must now get Congressional approval for thresholds with dollars that 
are greatly inflated, thus increasing Congressional control over the MYP process. 
This omission is clearly contrary to acquisition reform. FASA and Clinger-Cohen were 
typified by increasing thresholds to give the acquiring organizations additional flexibility to use 
streamlined procedures. 
In summary, it is apparent that there has only been one trend of acquisition reform 
dealing with MYPs. The action of modifying the required savings rates was taken prior to when 
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the Clinton Administration and Congress began their full-scale acquisition refonn initiatives. 
The reasoning as to why the Congressional Authorization committees legislated their stronger 
role of control over the MYP process is logical and sound, although not in accordance with 
acquisition refonn trends. Congress has done very little to refonn the MYP approval process 
throughout the 1990s. This omission coupled with inflation and lack of indexing has led to the 
increase of Congressional Control over the DOD MYP process. 
E. APPROPRIATE AMOUNT OF CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL 
The issue analyzeQ, in this section is whether the amount of control that Congress uses 
over the DOD MYP approval process is appropriate given the historical record. The 
methodology used to approach this problem is to analyze the approval ratio for fiscal years 1982 
.. through 1999 and to determine whether any trends exist which may indicate that the MYP 
approval process warrants modification. The MYP approval rate is defined as the number of 
MYP approvals divided by the number of MYP requests. Table 4.E.l summarizes the approval 
data presented in Chapter ill and exhibits the approval rates for fiscal years 1982 through 1999. 
Figure 4.E.l is a chart of the approval rates from Table 4.E.l with a linear regression plotted 
against it. It is evident from this figure that fiscal year 1990 is an outlying data point that is not 
consistent with the trend of MYP approval rates. This was the year Secretary Carlucci 
emphasized MYP to try to lock in future stability. Figure 4.E.2 is the same linear regression, 
which has omitted fiscal year 1990. Figures 4.E.3 and 4.E.4 are the same data as the first two 
charts, only plotted with a five year moving average trend line. 
Figures 4.E.l through 4.E.4 each exhibit a trend line that is increasing up close to a 100 
percent Congressional approval rate for DOD MYP re'i!uests. The researcher believes these trend 
lines demonstrate that DOD and Congress have become increasingly in sync as to interpretation 
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of the legislated MYP criteria. In the 1980s, there was a combination of two factors working to 
produce a lower approval rate. First, Congress was not confident that MYPs would yield 
significant savings that the DOD had advertised. (Ref. 67) Secondly, DOD did not fully 
understand Congress' thought processes and standards for programs where the approval decision 
was unclear. In 1990, Secretary of Defense Carlucci launched an initiative of trying to lock as 
many programs as he could into MYP, qualified or not. This was a one-time deviation from the 
normal DOD practice. Since 1991, DOD has learned how to request the programs, which will 
probably gain Congressional approval. 
MYP Approval Rate by Fiscal Year 
Fiscal Year Approved Requested Approval Rate 
1982 8 8 100% 
1983 7 13 54% 
1984 8 18 44% 
1985 9 12 75% 
1986 7 8 88% 
1987 6 8 75% 
1988 3 5 60% 
1989 9 9 100% 
1990 10 35 29% 
1991 6 7 86% 
1992 3 4 75% 
1993 2 2 100% 
1994 1 1 100% 
1996 3 3 100% 
1997 3 3 100% 
1998 8 8 100% 
1999 6 7 86% 
Totals 99 151 66% 
Table 4.E.l 
Note: 1995 is omitted because DOD did not request any MYPs. 
This increasing trend in the Congressional approval rate leads to one of two conclusions. 
First, the process is working very well, DOD and Congress are thinking along the same lines and 
the trends show that existing legislation and the associated level of control are appropriate. The 
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second conclusion is that the increasing approval rate opens the gate for acquisition refonn. 
Since Congress has approved 23 ofthe 24 MYP proposals since 1993, the approval requirements 
of the DOD's submitting MYP requests to Congress is redundant and only adds administrative 
burden and inefficiency to the MYP process. The refonn trends of empowennent and insight, 
instead of oversight, are consistent with this argument. Congress has legislated the criteria and 
provided the feedback, while the DOD has learned Congress' standards and processes. Now the 
DOD is ready to have the administratively burdensome Congressional MYP approval 
requirements removed, which will empower DOD to use their discretion of when to use MYP. 
The first point would counter that the DOD would return to the days of the Carlucci initiatives 
and go overboard on MYPs without Congress playing its oversight role as the "keeper of the 
purse". 
Chapter II described Congress' constitutionally directed role of oversight over the 
military. Congress has the responsibility to the United States' taxpayers to ensure that the 
military is operating effectively and efficiently spending the funds that have been appropriated 
by Congress. The issue is whether Congress will still have control over DOD if they delegate the 
MYP approval criteria down to the DOD. The answer is yes because Congress still has total 
control over the funds annually appropriated to the mUltiyear contract. Congress can direct the 
DOD to enter or withdraw from MYP via legislative action at any time. Congress still has the 
power and the authority to control the mUltiyear situation via its legislative authority. Given the 
recent trends of Congressional MYP approval rates approaching 100 percent as demonstrated 
earlier in this section, Congress' involvement in the MYP approval process is not be required and 
is administratively burdensome. If Congress desires to have the MYP approval process be 
consistent with acquisition reform trends of the 1990s, they should reduce the Congressional 
approval requirements. 
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The recent case of the multiyear small arms programs is a reason for Congress remaining 
involved in the MYP approval process. The small arms programs were MK19-3 grenade 
machine guns, M16A2 rifles, M249 Squad Automatic Weapons, and M4 carbine rifles. 
In 1995, the DOD Appropriations Act stated that the Army may use mUltiyear contracts to 
acquire thes~ small arms. Congress was planting the idea for DOD to purchase these programs 
with MYPs. DOD did not utilize this opportunity provided by Congress. Congress emphasized 
its desire, and strengthened its wording in the 1996 National Security Authorization Act by 
stating that the Army "shall enter into a multiyear procurement contract during fiscal year 1997." 
(Ref. 86: sec. 115) Later legislation revealed that Congress was directing this 'MYP for reas.ons 
of maintenance of the small arms industrial base. (Ref. 112: title 10, sec. 2473, subsections a-d) 
Even if Congress delegates the authority for MYP approval to DOD, they must maintain the 
control to be able to make industrial base and other strategic decisions in the interest of national 
security. 
F. RECENT EXPERIENCE WITH MYP DISAPPROVAL 
Fiscal years 1991 through 1999 have been a period characterized by extremely high 
Congressional approval rates as analyzed earlier. Congress approved 32 of the 35, or 91.4 
percent of MYP candidates proposed by DOD since the Carlucci initiative of 1990. The only 
request not approved during the past seven years was the T -45 Goshawk aircraft program in 
fiscal year 1999. As this is the only current disapproval it will be analyzed in 4epth. The 
, allowing section analyzes the T-45's proposal, the feedback provided by Congress and the final 
decisions legislated by Congress. It then briefly discusses the previous two programs which did 
not gain Congressional approval, the C-17 Aircraft in fiscal year 1992 and the UH-60 Black 
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Hawk in fiscal year 1991., subsequent analysis provide insight as to whether Congress has been 
adhering to the legislated MYP criteria when they have disapproved DOD MYP requests. 
1. The T -45 MYP Request 
The Navy, DOD and the President proposed the T -45 to Congress for MYP approval 
within the fiscal year 1999 Presidential budget. Appendices C through F are the MYP exhibits 
supporting the request. The proposed MYP would acquire 64 total aircraft at a rate of 15 per year 
for a total cost of $863.6 million from Boeing (MDA). The following are the highlights of the 
MYP exhibits: 
-Substantial Savings. A savings rate of 5.2 percent for the MYP versus a series of annual 
contracts was proposed for $47.4 million total dollar savings. 
-Stable Requirement. The Navy plans to use the T -45 through 2035 in order to maintain a 
viable program for training naval aviators. The increasingly unreliable T-2 aircraft has added 
additional stability to the T -45 requirement. 
-Stable Funding. Funding for the T-45 has been stable since 1992. The Navy and DOD are' 
committed to funding this program. Funding stability risk is assessed as being low. 
-Stable Design. The T -45 is currently over half way through its procurement phase. The new 
cockpit configuration recently competed tests by the Navy's Operational Test and Evaluation 
Force with satisfactory results. Design stability risk is assessed as being low. 
-Degree of Cost Confidence. The 5.2 percent savings rate was developed using Boeing 
McDonnell Douglas Aircraft's (MDA) inputs and a NA V AIRSYSCOM (AIR-4.2.2) budget 
model, which is regularly updated with actual cost data and forward price agreement data. Cost 
confidence risk is considered to be low. 
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-Degree of Confidence in Contractor Capability. Boeing has adequate plant capacity. They 
have produced the aircraft already. Discussions have been held with Boeing's management to 
correct delivery schedule problems which have recently occurred. See appendices C through F 
for details. 
The T -45 program office received feedback from the Senate Armed Services Committee 
through the Congressional Liaison Office that the 5.2 percent savings rate was too low; however 
if the savings could be increased to 5.5 percent or higher, the proposal should be approved. The 
program office then held discussions with Boeing (MDA) management and figured a way to get 
the savings rate up to 5.5 percent. Boeing was reluctant to make new capital investments that 
would spur addition savings for several reasons. The T -45 was half way through its production 
phase. This meant the process was in place and there was not sufficient time remaining to make 
new capital investment a cost-effective decision. Secondly, Boeing (MDA) is currently in the 
low rate initial production phase of the F/A-18EIF Super Hornet. They are also one ofthe two 
teams competing on the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). (Ref. 8) These potentially huge contracts 
would be very influential upon the future profitability of the firm. Thus, Boeing is focusing its 
efforts on F/A-18 and JSF. Finally, Boeing is going to be awarded the T-45 contracts if the Navy 
reverts to an annual contract. Combined, these factors do not provide Boeing with great incentive 
to break from the status quo to facilitate the Navy attaining a higher savings rate and making 
MYP for the T-45 more attractive. (Ref. 64) 
Shortly into fiscal year 1999, the Appropriation and Authorization Bills were published. 
The Authorization bill approved the T-45 for MYP. (Ref. 92) The Appropriations bill did not 
approve the T -45 for MYP. (Ref. 41) This was the first MYP not to be approved since the C-17 
aircraft in 1992. Historically, Congress does not specifically give reasons for disapproval, but 
indications can be gained by looking at the signals that Congress provides. Sources of these 
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signals from Congress include requests for clarification, pointed questions, direction for proposal 
modification and Congressional hearings. The T -45 MYP request is the next area of analysis. 
Upon reviewing Appendices B through E and co~pling it with the signals sent by 
Congress, it is readily apparent the major issue was cost savings or avoidance. The criteria of 
requirement, funding and design stability were clearly satisfied. The production capability of 
Boeing (MDA), a firm with vast commercial and DOD experience is definitely low risk. It 
appears the minor schedule problems have been solved. This leaves the issues of substantial cost 
saving and the confidence in these savings. 
The following methodology was utilized to analyze the cost issue: (1) the approved GAO 
MYP assessments with their estimated TOA savings rates and totals from Chapter ill df this 
study were gathered. The GAO assessments were chosen because they are a body of 
assessments in which the' data were readily available. It was assumed that the programs upon 
which Congress tasked GAO to conduct audits was a random sample of all MYP requests. (2) 
The programs that were approved, but not awarded a mUltiyear contract were eliminated. These 
programs were eliminated because they represent programs, which DOD made the final 
determination that it was not in the best interest of the DOD and national security that MYP be 
used. This left only good, solid, approved and awarded MYP programs. (3) The total savings 
were adjusted by the applicable CPI factor to 1998 constant dollars. This allows comparison of 
savings values across all years. (4) The remaining approved and awarded MYPs were charted 
comparing their estimated TOA savings rates versus their CPI adjusted estimated total TOA 
. , 
savings. Trend analysis was then performed to determine if there was a good relationship 
between the plotted data. (5) The same data from the T -45 proposal were then plotted on the 
chart from step four. (6) The T-45 proposal was then compared to the approved and awarded 
program's trend line and comparisons were drawn. 
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Table 4.F.l, which was created by the researcher, summarizes the data from steps one, 
two and three. Figures 4.F.l and 4.F.2, created by the researcher, are charts formed by 
comparing the approved and awarded MYP's estimated TOA savings rates versus their CPI 
adjusted estimated total TOA savings. Both charts have the same data plotted, only the first 
displays the exponential regression while the second displays the linear regression. It is evident 
by observation that th~ linear and exponential regressions are very similar. 
Fiscal Estimated Estimated CPI Adjusted 
Program Year TOASavin~s TOA Savings Estimated TOA 
Rate Savin2s 
F-16 Aircraft 1982 7.7% 256.8 466.3 
CH-47D Helicopter 1989 13.2% 118.3 163.6 
H-60 Re-engine 1989 12.2% 44.6 61.7 
MLRS 1989 11.4% 126.9 175.5 
AV-8B 1989 11.9% 165.5 228.9 
UHF Satellite 1989 11.5% 194.8 269.4 
DMSP 1989 18.1% 99.6 137.7 
PLS 1990 12.7% 153.1 202.0 
FMTV 1991 12.9% 197.4 247.1 
Avenger 1991 9.3% 60.8. 76.1 
GPS 1991 19.8% 115.3 144.3 
C-17 Aircraft 1996 5.2% 834:8 898.5 
Table 4.F.l 
The linear and exponential trend line from 'Figure 4.F.l and 4.F.2 demonstrate that there 
is a relationship between the estimated savings rates and total savings that are good MYP 
candidates and will gain Congressional approval. Historically, Congress has wanted a minimum 
of ten to twelve percent savings rate as is evident by the cluster of programs on the left side of 
the charts in the ten to fourteen percent range. Then the term "substantial" was applied to 
savings. This gave Congress and DOD the flexibility to apply good business sense. The C-17 
was an excellent example of this judgment. Even though the savings rate was barely above five 
percent, the total savings were $1.03 billion. In this era of fiscal scrutiny, this is a wise business 
decision that will allow DOD and Congress additional budgeting flexibility to add new 
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programs, increase funding to existing programs or avoid cutting programs if budget cuts are 
required. The trend lines demonstrate that as total TOA savings gets larger, Congress will accept 
a lower savings rate for the program. Above the line represents programs that Congress looked 
upon very favorably. Below the line are programs that were still approved, but are weaker in this 
criterion. ThC? proposals below the line may have to be stronger in the other MYP criteria to 
balance out for being below the savings tradeoff curve. It is logical and a good business practice 
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Total Savings vs. Savings Rate 
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When comparing the T 45's position on Figures 4.F.l and 4.F.2 to the tradeoff trend line 
of approved and awarded MYPs, it reinforces the hypothesis that insufficient cost savings were a 
reason for the MYP rejection. The T 45's combination of low savings rate and relatively low 
total savings, do not make it a good candidate for MYP. When plotted on Figure 4.F.l, it falls 
well below the trend line, making it a less favorable candidate. It is an outlying datum point that 
does not fit with the approved and awarded MYPs. Additionally, when it is considered that the 
savings rate had to be worked to get up to S.5 percent, it lowers the confidence factor that the 
savings will be achieved. This leads the researcher to believe that given the shortfalls in cost 
savings, Congress made the correct decision in not approving the T -45 for MYP in fiscal year 
1999. 
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2. Earlier Disapprovals 
The next most current MYP requests to be disapproved by Congress prior to the T -45 
were the C-17 in fiscal year 1992 and the UH-60 in fiscal year 1991. This section briefly 
discusses the circumstances surrounding these MYP requests and assesses Congress' decisions 
for disapproval. 
The C-17 Aircraft was first proposed for MYP in fiscal year 1992. It was a program that 
experienced great turmoil for many years. Several of the MYP criteria were not met by the C-17 
program during the Myp'review process in 1991. The criterion of design stability was not met. 
The C-17 was not meeting key performance parameters. Engineering changes were continually 
being implemented in an effort to improve performance. As a result, every plane produced had a 
. unique configuration. This does not meet the stability requirement for MYP. McDonnell 
Douglas had overrun the development contract by $1.1 billion. McDonnell Douglas was making 
claims that the Air Force had changed the scope of the contract. Air Force Officials had 
significant concerns whether McDonnell Douglas had the management expertise to perform 
successfully. These factors culminate in the determination th~t the realism of cost savings is 
high risk. (Ref. 76) Considering all the configuration and financial problems that occurred with 
the C-17 program, the researcher concurs with the Congressional decision that the C-17 program 
was not ready for MYP in fiscal year 1992. 
The UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter was proposed in the Fiscal Year 1991 President's 
Budget for MYP to begin in fiscal year 1992. The program was then in a MYP that had begun in 
fiscal year 1988 and was due to end in fiscal year 1991. During the Congressional review of the 
MYP request, the Army submi~ted their Program Objective Memorandum (POM), which did not 
include funding for the UH-60 program after the current mUltiyear contract expired at the end of 
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fiscal year 1991. This action by the Anny clearly demonstrated that they did not have stable 
funding for the length ofthe proposed MYP. (Ref. 75) This complete failure to satisfy the 
criterion of stable funding of the UH -60 program was ample reason for Congress to disapprove 
this MYP request. This is a situation where having one of the criteria so decisively not satisfying 
the legislated crite~a, it is not possible for the other criteria to be strong enough to balance out 
for the deficiency. Therefore, the researcher agrees with Congress that the UH -60 did not 
warrant MYP approval at that time. 
This analysis of the last three disapproved MYP requests indicates that Congress had 
valid reasons to disapprove those programs and had acted within the legislated bounds of the 
MYP criteria. 
G.SUMMARY 
Chapter four has analyzed the principle issues of this thesis. From these analyses it is 
apparent that the Congressional MYP approval process is not a black and white process, but a 
process which considers many legislated and non-legislated factors in making the final decision. 
The rationale for these decisions is not explicitly published, but hypotheses about the reasons for 
. specific programs approval or disapproval can be formed based upon the signals provided by 
Congress and by comparison to past MYP approvals. MYP legislation has made slight changes 
during the 1990s that allow the DOD increased use of judgement when considering MYP, but 
increased empowerment of DOD is still required. The analysis demonstrates that Congress and 
the DOD were in sync on which recent programs should enter multiyear contracts. Analysis 
demonstrated that cancellation risk is not as high as it had been perceived. These factors 
culminate in fostering an environment that is open to new MYP acquisition reforms, which will 
loosen the control Congress holds over the DOD MYP process and make the process 
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increasingly effective and efficient. Chapter V answers the thesis questions, provides final 
conclusions and offers recommendations for improving the MYP acquisition process. 
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v. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The overall purpose of this thesis is to examine the relationship that exists between the 
Department of Defense (DOD) and Congress regarding mUltiyear procurement (MYP) and to 
determine if this relationship has changed, consistent with acquisition reform initiatives. This 
chapter presents conclusions based upon the research, provides recommendations for 
improvement of the MYP process, answers the thesis questions and provides potential areas for 
future research. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
1. Multiyear contract cancellation risk is not as high as it is generally perceived. 
Cancellation risk is perceived to be one ofthe primary deterrents to MYP. Chapter N, 
Section C, conducts analysis comparing the total cancellations fees paid by the DOD from 1982 
through 1998 and the total estimated dollar savings of all MYPs that were awarded during that 
same time period. The data demonstrate that the total savings of utilizing MYP versus a series of 
annual contracts were $1.54 billion. Only three MYPs have been canceled after award during 
this period. The total cancellation fees paid were $13 million. Thus, the financial benefits of 
$1.54 billion are 887 times the financial costs of $13 million. This relationship leads the 
researcher to conclude that the financial risk associated with cancellation fees is very low under 
the current process. 
2. MYP legislation has not fully evolved consistent with acquisition reform initiatives of 
the 1990s. 
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The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 (F ASA) and the Clinger/Cohen Act of 
1996 had a tremendous impact in changing the acquisition procedures within the DOD and all of 
Government. Highlights of F ASA and Clinger/Cohen include streamlining, empowerment, 
increased discretion to make smart business decisions, increased thresholds, increased efficiency, 
commercial practices, commercial pricing and reduced reliance on military specifications. These 
reforms essentially seek to streamline and make the acquisition process more efficient. 
There has only been one area of MYP legislation, which has changed consistently with 
acquisition reform initiati¥es of the 1990s. This change was the MYP criteria of savings 
requirements for MYP as compared to a series of annual contracts. The legislation in fiscal year 
1989 required ten percent savings as compared to current negotiated contracts or twelve percent 
savings if no recent contract experience exists. Fiscal year 1991 's legislation changed the 
requirement to ten percent savings as compared to current negotiated contracts or ten percent 
savings if no recent experience exists. In fiscal year 1993 the legislation was changed to read 
"substantial savings" and has remained intact through the present (1998). This change from 
10112 to 10/10 percent to substantial savings is an excellent example of acquisition reform. It 
represents Congress giving the DOD additional flexibility when considering a candidate for 
MYP. It allows the DOD to consider using MYP in situations where the savings might not meet 
the old ten or twelve percent requirements, but the other MYP criteria are so strong, they balance 
out for the slight decrease in cost savings. Additionally, very large programs like the C-17 may 
only save five percent, but that five percent equates to a savings of approximately one billion 
dollars. This sum represents a tremendous amount of savings and a smart business decision, 
which is worthwhile for consideration for MYP. 
During the period of fiscal years 1993 through 1999, Congress approved 23 of 24 MYPs 
requested by the DOD. This demonstrates that the DOD is now submitting MYP candidates that 
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gain Congressional approval approximately 95 percent of the time. This high approval rate also 
leads to the conclusion that the current MYP procedures include reporting requirements that are 
redundant. Congressional reporting requirements do not add substantial value to the MYP 
process and therefore should be loosened to make the process more efficient. Methods for 
empowerment and adding discretion to the DOD are discussed in Section C below. 
3. Congressional rationale for MYP approval/rejection decision is not clear. 
Congress does not explicitly state why specific MYP requests are approved or rejected. 
Often Congress does send signals to DOD in the form or questions or recommendations for 
needed improvement. These signals are not concrete legislation, but indications of the intent of 
some individuals or groups in Congress. Reading these signals is not a precise science but can be 
utilized to gain an understanding of why a specific MYP may have been rejected. 
Contrary to the Congressional signals about the programs, the approval and rejection 
record is legislated and concrete. Analysis of the legislated criteria of approved and disapproved 
programs can give an indication as to what rationale Congress applied to the MYP 
approval/rejection decision. General Accounting Office (GAO) reports that evaluated MYP 
candidates are used as unbiased assessments of th~ required criteria. Twenty-three assessments 
were located. They were separated into approved and disapproved categories. The approved and 
disapproved categories were then tabulated and averaged for each of the five required criteria. 
There were four purposes of this GAO analysis that was conducted in Chapter N, 
Section B. The first purpose is to determine which criterion, if any, was the most influential in 
effecting the Congressional approval/disapproval decision. The results were inconclusive. There 
was not a significant difference in any criterion comparing the approved and the disapproved 
categories. This analysis leads the researcher to the conclusion that success or failure in any 
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criteria is not significant in determining if a MYP request will gain Congressional approval or 
disapproval. 
The second purpose of this analysis is to determine if there is a difference between the 
averages of how many criteria GAO had questions with on the approved versus the disapproved 
MYP requests. The analysis indicated that on average the five programs that were disapproved 
were slightly better candidates than the eighteen candidates that were approved. This leads the 
researcher to conclude that there must be other factors that are at least as significant as the 
legislated program criteria in the MYP approval/disapproval decision-making criteria. 
The third purpose is to look for programs that were approved which should not have been 
approved. There were three programs of which GAO had questions with four out of the five 
legislated MYP criteria. Chapter IV, Section B, Sub-section 2 analyzed each of these programs 
in depth. It is clear from the .analysis that these three programs did not satisfy the legislated 
intent for MYPs and should not have been approved. 
The fourth purpose is to look for programs that should have been approved, but were not. 
There were only two requests that were close to fitting in this category. They both only had 
GAO questions in one criterion, and that was cost savings. These two cases occurred in 1990, an 
especially turbulent fiscal period. Given the fiscal turmoil that existed at that time, the 
researcher concludes that the rejection decision was a fair one. 
The final analysis from this section is on the last three MYP requests that Congress has 
rejected. The analysis was based on interviews with program office personnel and literature 
reviews. The T -45 in fiscal year 1999 had inadequate savings. The C-17 in fiscal year 1992 had 
significant cost and design problems. The UH-60, which was proposed in fiscal year 1991, was 
not funded in the Army's Program Objective Memorandum (POM). This lack of funding was the 
driving factor that led to the DR-60's MYP rejection. Each of these analyses leads the researcher 
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to conclude that Congress used sound judgment in the last three MYP requests that were 
rejected. 
The analysis of the factors leading to Congression~ approval or rejection of MYP 
candidates has yielded varied results. Some decisions seemed to be made in accordance with the 
legislated criteria and some were not. The analysis that used GAO assessments led the 
researcher to one of the three following conclusions: (1) the GAO audits were not accurate; (2) 
the numeric method of this analysis was not able to take into effect how strong or weak GAO's 
questions were on specific criteria; or (3) there are other factors more important to Congress in 
the MYP approval decision than the legislated criteria. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. The DOD should be empowered to apply more discr~tion over when to utilize M~ by 
increasing and indexing thresholds. 
The process for MYP candidate review is basically a good one. The system is working 
based on the recent Congressional MYP approval rates. The problem is that Congress' omission 
to index key thresholds to keep pace with inflation has led to increased Congressional oversight 
into smaller programs than when the legislation was originally enacted. There are three numeric 
dollar values that are critical in the CongressionallDOD MYP relationship: (1) the $100 million 
cancellation ceiling notification requirement, (2) the $20 million economic order quantity 
(EOQ) notification requirement and (3) the $500 million contract value approval requirement. 
These values were initially instituted in 1982, 1983 and 1986. Chapter IV, Section D contains 
details of this analysis. These values should first be raised significantly, consistent with the 
acquisition reform trends of raising thresholds. This will empower the DOD to make decisions 
, 
without the burden of reporting to Congress. Congress will still maint~n the same process for 
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the higher dollar MYPs, which is an efficient use of their efforts and satisfies their constitutional 
oversight requirements. Once these thresholds have been raised, they should be indexed 
annually based upon the consumer price index to maintain the constant level of intent for 
Congressional control over the DOD MYP process. 
2. Congress should be required to state reasons in writing why specific MYPs are not 
approved. 
Congress does not currently state why programs are rejected for MYP. Signals are often 
sent by Congress but often these signals are not consIstent. Mixed signals can send a program 
office in the wrong direction, which is very inefficient. Congress should be required to state in 
writing why a program was rejected. This will allow program offices to know exactly where 
they stand and give them more information that will help in determining if they should pursue 
MYP in the next approval cycle. 
D. ANSWE~ TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This section begins by answering the subsidiary questions that were proposed in Chapter 
One. The supporting analysis for the answers comes "from the analysis within Chapter IV, and 
the conclusions of Chapter V, Section A. This section will culminate in the answering of the 
. primary research question that was also proposed in Chapter I. The following are the subsidiary 
questions and answers: 
1. What are the current policies and regulations pertaining to MYP? The DOD can 
consider MYP when a program meets the following criteria: substantial savings, stable 
requirement, stable funding, stable design, realistic cost savings and promotion of national 
security. MYPs with values greater than $500 million must be approved by both an 
Appropriation Act and an "other than Appropriation Act". The DOD must notify Congress 30 
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days prior to awarding a contract with a cancellation ceiling greater than $100 million. The 
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) must certify to Congress that a program is fully funded 
and minimum economic production rates will by achieved by the contract. MYPs with greater 
than $20 million EOQ procurement, unfunded contingent liability or advance procurement 
leading to MYP requires Congressional notification at least 30 days prior to award. DOD may 
not terminate a MYP without notifying Congress at least ten days in advance of the proposed 
termination. 
2. What has been DOD's experience with Congress' MYP approval process? The 1980s 
were a period characterized by DOD and Congress learning how to utilize the MYP process and 
testing whether the savings would materialize from MYPs. In 1990 Secretary of Defense 
Carlucci emphasized use of MYPs. This was a very turbulent fiscal time with the fall of the 
Soviet Union and the public's demand for a peace dividend. The researcher believes Secretary 
Carlucci saw future Defense budgets shrinking and wanted to lock into and provide stability for 
as many DOD programs as possible. The 1990s were a period of reduced DOD spending and the 
quantity of MYPs dropped considerably compared to the 1980s. High approval rates in the 1990s 
indicates that Congress and DOD were thinking along similar lines when evaluating programs 
forMYP. 
3. What are the primary Congressional considerations leading to MYP approval/rejection 
decisions? Analysis of the legislated criteria of 23 GAO MYP assessments comparing their 
Congressional approval/disapproval decision record, resulted in the determination that there was 
not a significant difference between the approved and disapproved candidates. In fact, the 
disapproved candidates scored slightly higher on GAO's assessments than the approved MYPs. 
This leads the researcher to believe that there are often considerations other than the legislated 
MYP criteria that are the primary Congressional consideration. 
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4. Has Congress adhered to its stated MYP approval/rejection criteria? Analysis of the 
23 GAO assessments produced mixed results. Three programs were approved in which GAO 
rated four out of five criteria as not clearly meeting the l~gislated requirements. Two programs 
were not approved, yet had only the one criterion of savings not clearly meeting the legislated 
requirement. The GAO assessments provided reasonable to good support for the remaining 17 
MYP request decisions. As stated in question three, the analysis of the GAO assessments 
determined that the disapproved candidates rated slightly higher than the approved candidates. 
Analysis of the last three MYP requests to be disapproved, which did not have GAO 
assessments, yielded the conclusion that Congress had made the correct decision. In summary, 
these statements indicate that Congressional adherence to the MYP criteria has varied from 1982 
through 1998. 
5. What is the DOD's experience with MYP program cancellations? There have been 
only three program cancellations since 1982, the MK-46 torpedo, the Hawk Missile and the 
Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV). The total cancellation fees paid for these MYPs 
was $13 million, which was all, paid by the Hawk Missile Program. The MK-46 and the FMTV 
both did not have cancellation fees associated with the contract cancellation. When comparing 
the $13 million figure t01he estimated TOA savings of MYPs, which were approved and 
awarded of $ 11.54 billion from fiscal years 1982 through 1999, it is clear that the financial 
benefits far outweigh the potential cancellation fees associated with MYP. 
6. What is the relationship between the rationale Congress has given for rejection of 
. , 
MYPs and their stated approval/rejection criteria? This is a question that can not be answered 
definitively. Congress does not state why they approve or reject a MYP request. However, they 
I 
do send signals by the questions they may ask DOD, direction given to DOD or by hearings. 
These signals may provide a general idea, a specific idea or no idea at .all of why a program was 
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approved or not. Interpretation of these signals is all DOD has to determine the reasoning for 
Congress' approval or rejection rationale. The most recent rejection was the T -45 aircraft in 
fiscal year 1999. Congress expressed concern over the low 5.2 percent savings rate. The T -45 
program office received direction from the appropriation committees that if they were able to 
raise the savings ra~e to 5.5 percent,the request would receive MYP approval. The Navy and the 
contractor reached a plan that would.achieve 5.5 percent and then the request was rejected. The 
exact reasoning for the rejection is unknown, but it probably had to do with the savings rate, 
which was low, compared to the historical norms. 
7. Has Congress altered MYP policies as a result of recent acquisition reform 
initiatives? Congress changed the required savings rate criterion for MYP from twelve percent 
to ten percent to substantial savings from fiscal year 1989 to 1991. This is consistent with 
acquisition reform initiatives of the 1990s. The 1998 National Defense Authorization Act 
legislated that an Appropriation Act and an "other than Appropriation Act" must approve a MYP 
request. This action legislated what had been a Congressional rule and is in keeping with what 
had been normal operating procedure for most MYPs. Despite the logic of this legislation, it is 
adding additional administrative burden to the M~ approval process that is counter to the 
streamlining initiatives of the NPR, FASA and Clinger-Cohen. In summary, Congress has made 
only one significant change to the DOD MYP legislation from 1989 through 1998. 
8. Is the amount of Congressional control over the DOD's MYP process appropriate? 
Congress approved 57 of 81 requested programs, or 70 percent, from fiscal year 1982 through 
1989. Congress approved 10 of35, or 30 percent of MYPs proposed in fiscal year 1990 during 
the year of the Carlucci MYP initiative. During the period of fiscal years 1991 through 1999, 
Congress approved 32 of 35 MYPs or 91 percent of MYPs proposed. Considering the facts that 
since 1991,91 percent ofMYPs have been approved, including 23 of the last 24 through fiscal 
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year 1999, it leads the researcher to believe that the amount of control Congress holds over the 
DOD is excessively tight and in need of loosening. These high approval rates demonstrate that 
DOD's screening process for MYPs yields similar decisions as Congress'. These similar results 
mean that redundancy exists which should be streamlined to reduce Congressional control over 
the DOD such as empowerment would be consistent with current acquisition reform initiatives. 
9. How might MYP policy be changed to improve the acquisition process? The 
researcher recommends the following changes: (I) Index all legislated threshold dollar values; 
(2) Reduce the timing rigidity for the MYP Congressional approval process; (3) Require 
Congress to state reasons in writing why specific MYPs are not approved. Details for these 
recommendations are provided in Section B above. 
The subsidiary questions above are all fundamental elements and provide the details that 
answer the primary research question as follows: What role does Congress play with respect to 
Department of Defense mUltiyear procurement policy and has mUltiyear procurement approval 
criteria changed as a result of recent acquisition reform initiatives? The fact is that Congress has 
very tight control over the MYP process for major acquisitions. Congress must give the DOD 
approval to enter MYP and then annually fund the programs to allow them to continue. DOD 
must even notify Congress before they cancel a MYP with a large cancellation ceiling. MYP 
approval criteria have changed in the area of required savings to allow DOD additional discretion 
in the decision of whether use of MYP is appropriate. Several additional areas of MYP 
legislation are ripe for reform. The DOD has learned how to interpret Congress' legislated MYP 
criteria and has enjoyed a very high Congressional approval rate in the 1990s. This success rate 
has set the stage for additional acquisition reforms in the area of MYP. 
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E. AREAS OF FURTHER RESEARCH 
This thesis dealt with the relationship between Congress and the DOD with respect to 
MYP in an acquisition reform environment. Additional areas of research relating to MYP that· 
were outside the scope of this thesis include: 
1. It is commonly believed that once a program enters into MYP, any modification will 
be a costly endeavor for the Government. Investigate what flexibility exists once the 
Government has entered into a MYP. What contracting mechanisms can be utilized to facilitate 
flexibility for multiyear contracts and minimize excessive modification costs? 
2. Investigate the legality and potential benefit of utilizing integrated product teams 
(lPTs) with both the DOD and Congressional personnel. What are the risks associated with this 
concept? Would these IPTs foster improved relations and increased efficiency of the DOD and 
Congressional relations? Identify areas of the DOD and Congressional interactions where 
institution ofIPTs may be useful. Identify who from Congress and their staffs should sit in these 
IPTs. 
3. What factors exist outside of the legislated criteria that are influential on the MYP 
approval/disapproval decision? How important are these factors? What is their importance 
relative to the legislated criteria? Should their influence be mitigated and how can this be 
accomplished? 
4. What are the effects ofMYP on competition? Does the benefit of a long-term contract 
induce additional contractors to vie for a MYP? Do contractors who lose the contract go out of 
business or look to other markets when they lose? Do these firms maintain their required 































APPENDIX A: ACRONYMS 
Congressional ,Budget Office 
Commercial Off-the-Shelf 
Defense Acquisition Board 
Department of Defense 
Defense Resource Planning Board 
Economic Order Quantity 
Federal Acquisition Computer Network 
Federal Acquisition Reform Act 
Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act 
Future Years Defense Plan 
General Accounting Office 
Information Technology 
Information Technology Management Reform Act 
McDonnell Douglas Aircraft 
Multiyear Procurement 
Non-Developmental Item 
National Performance Review 
Office of Management and Budget 
Office of the Secretary of Defense 
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 
Procurement Decision Memorandum 
Program Executive Officer 
Program Objective Memorandum 
Planning, Programming and Budgeting System 
Senate Armed Service Committee 
Secretary of Defense 
Total Obligation Authority 






APPENDIX B: EXHIBIT MYP-1 , MULTIYEAR PROCUREMENT CRITERIA 
Date: #fs!i!;;;;liil:; 
Program _T_-4_5:.....T....,:S ____________ _ 
Multiyear Procurement Description: 
The proposed airframe multiyear procurement covers the period from FY99 through program buyout in FY03. 
The procurement quantities follow are: FY99=15 AlC, FYOO=15 AlC, FY01=15 AlC, FY02 = 15 AlC & 
FY03=4 AlC. This multiyear procurement is structured with separately identified Economic Order 
Quantity (EOQ) advance procurement funding. EOQ requirements. and resultant contract savings are detailed 
below. Termination liability (TL) is wholly contained in the annual funding amounts ofthe MYP. There are no 
additional nonrecurring costs as the contractor requires no new significant tooling to produce the aircraft. 
Advance procurement for the airframe is required for termination liability in FY98 for FY99, and advance 
procurement for EOQ is required for FY99 =$57.2M, FYOO= $62.8M, FY01=$14.9M and FY02=$3.0M. 
Contract type will continue to be firm-fixed price, with salient features being an economic price adjustment, 
, acts of God clause, business base fluctuations, material escalation, and foreign exchange rate protection. 
This MYP is fully funded on an annual basis across the five years from FY99 to FY03. In the event of 
cancellation, the government would negotiate a settlement, and it is anticipated funds included in 
the budget would cover all costs. 
2. Benefit to the Government. 
a. Savings and Cost Avoidance: 
The proposed multiyear savings come from the following areas (based on Boeing (MDA) input), and have 
been reviewed by the Naval Center for Cost Analysis (NCCA). NCCA found the estimating methodologies 
utilized by Boeing as reasonable, and consistent with other aircraft multiyear savings as reflected in 
the OSD Cost Analysis Improvement (CAl G) data base. All savings are derived from a savings 




Boeing in-house MYP Savings 
Overall, this type of savings results from the increased efficiency of a stable labor force 
.: Integrated Product Development 1.0% 
6.5% Reduction in Engineering (primarily design) staff in order 
to sustain the production line. As production quantities will be 
known for 4.3 years, hours on certain taskings, such as preparing 
drawings, will be reduced. 
14% Reduction in labor hours for the Tool Design/Manufacturing processes. 
This % is based on previous AV-SB FYS9-91 MYP experience. Fewer hours 
would be required of Mfg. Engineers/Mfg. planners under a MYP as 
manufacturing changes would be issued fewer times as building components 
and assemblies would be for EOQ vice annual quantities. Stable (under 
contract) EOQ quantities and configuration are required. 
- Manufacturing 0.7% 
1.0% Reduction in Setups. Set-up is a small % of Mfg. costs, 
and Boeing antiCipates a 40% reduction in set-ups. This will 
equate to a 1 % savings in touch labor. 
14% Reduction in Sustaining Tool/Plan as a result of 
fewer setups/stability in production. This 14% is also based on 
AV-SB MYP experience and the statement in IPD above applies. 
- Supplier Management & Procurement 
5.0% Staff reduction due to a requirement to place 
& monitor fewer orders as a result of EOQ 
Savings result from negotiating sub-contractor / vendor 
contracts once instead of five times. 
Procurement 
Overall, these savings are attributable to "bulk" purchases of items 
0.3% 
to cover 4.3 years of manufacturing the T -45 aircraft. Includes fewer 
manufacturing runs for machined parts, thereby eliminating parts obsolescence 
Basically, it involves ordering in Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) lots. 
\0 
~ 
- 8.0% Reduction in Material, including forgings, castings, raw materi 0.4% 
as a result of procuring EOQ quantities from vendors 
- 4.8% Reduction in CFE/Subcontract. This % was obtained by 0.4% 
quotes from the 4 largest vendors, and applying savings across all vendors. 
Major components for EOQ funding include Landing Gear, Avionics, 
Lights, Switches, and Indicators 
- 5.4% Reduction from British Aerospace (BAE) based on quote from 2.4% 
BAE. EOQ items include Center and Aft Fuselage, Wings, Tail Cone 
and Rudder. 5.2% 
Cost avoidance is not dependent on a MYP. The annual procurement quantity has been accelerated 
from the FY98 President's Budget submittal and does produce significant cost avoidance because the 
program no longer buys low annual quantities of 6 or 7 airplanes in FY04 and FY05. 
b. Impact on Industrial Base: 
None. 
c. Aircraft Deliveries: 
The MYP delivers the last T -45C aircraft two years earlier than under the previous budget submit, 
providing cost avoidance savings of $363M from potential FY04/05 budget submissions. 
3. Stabilitv of Requirement. 
The requirement for the procurement of T -45's is stable. ·In addition, the problems associated with the 
aging and increasingly unreliable T-2's lead to increased stability for the T -45 program. 
The Navy needs the T -45 aircraft in order to maintain a viable program for training naval aviators. 
The Navy will purchase these aircraft whether they are part of a multiyear or a regular annualized 
procurement, and since there is a stable requirement it only makes sense to realize MYP savings 
for the American taxpayer. The Navy is considering procuring additional aircraft for attrition purposes 
in order to fly the T -45 through FY2035, thus demonstrating further requirement stability. 
4. Stabilitv of Funding. 
Funding for the T -45TS program has been stable since 1992. The Navy and 000 are firmly 
committed to providing continued funds for the T -45. 
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5. Stable Configuration. 
The T-45 plane is a mature plane that is currently over halfway through its procurement life. 
The new Cockpit-21 configuration has been extensively tested. This modification was determined by 
the Navy's Operational Test and Evaluation Force to be both effective and suitable for the training 
mission. The configuration is considered stable by Naval leadership and the customer (CNATRA) is 
extremely pleased with the T-45 performance. 
6. Degree of Cost Confidence. 
The following exhibits have been put together using AIR-4.2.2's budget model, .which is regularly 
updated with actual cost data and forward price agreement data. Additiona"y, multiyear procurement 
savings of 5.2% (annual off of the Airframe) were developed utilizing contractor Boeing(MDA) 
input. The assumptions, methodology, and savings utilized by Boeing were independently reviewed 
by the NCCA, and were deemed to be reasonable by NCCA. . 
7. Degree of Confidence in Contractor Capability. 
The Government is confident that Boeing (MDA) will be able to support and deliver the proposed 
aircraft procurement schedule. This statement is made based on discussions with Boeing's 
management after reviewing Boeing's past performance. Management is committed to 
to ensuring this aircraft meets the delivery schedule, as Boeing is on schedule to overcome 
previously identified delivery problems by June 1998. Plant capacity is not an issue. 






9. Multiyear Summary. 
Quantity 
Total Contract Price 
$ Cost Avoidance Over Annual 












Based on comments above 
Based on comments above 
Based on comments above 






APPENDIX C: MYP-1, TOTAL PROGRAM FUNDING PLAN 
Exhibit MYP-2, Total Program Funding Plan Date January-98 
Appropriation/Budget Activity P-1 Line Item Nomenclature 
Aircraft Procurement, Navy/APN-3, Trainer Aircraft T-45TS MYP 
FY 1998 FY 1999 FY 2000 FY2001 FY 2002 FY2003 FY2004 
Annual Procurement 
Proc Qty 15 15 15 15 4 0 
Gross Cost 299.7 316.3 298.6 292.4 111.8 
Less Adv Proc 6.1 8.0 8.2 8.3 . 2.8 
Net Proc (=P-1) 293.6 308.3 290.4 284.0 109.0 
Plus Adv Proc 6.1 8.0 8.2 8.3 2.8 0.0 
Weapon System 6.1 301.6 316.4 298.7 286.8 109.0 
Multiyear Proc 
Proc Qty 15 15 15 15 4 0 
Gross Cost (P-1) 288.8 305.2 287.5 281.5 108.3 
Less Adv Proc 6.1 40.4 56.7 43.0 8.1 
Net Proc 282.7 264.8 230.8 238.5 100.2 
AP for FY99 6.1 
AP for FYOO 40.4 
AP for FY01 12.5 44.2 
AP for FY02 7.3 21.6 14.1 
AP for FY03 0.0 0.0 4.0 4.0 0.0 
TotalAP 6.1 60.2 65.8 18.1 4.0 0.0 
Weapon System 6.1 342.8 330.7 249.0 242.5 100.2 
Multiyear Savings ($) 0.0 -41.2 -14.2 49.8 44.3 8.8 
Multiyear Savings (%) 
OUTLAYS 
Annual 1.1 56.0 144.5 240.3 275.1 248.6 188.2 
Multiyear 2.1 21.1 247.0 338.3 238.3 211.1 143.4 
Savings -1.0 34.9 -102.5 -98.0 36.8 37.5 44.8 
Remarks 
--------- - -- --- -
FY2005 FY2006 FY2007 FY2008 Total 


















99.2 40.9 19.2 5.6 1318.7 
48.6 13.2 6.0 2.2 1271.3 




APPENDIX D, EXHIBIT MYP-3, CONTRACT FUNDING PLAN 
Exhibit MYP-3, Contract Funding Plan Date January-98 
Appropriation/Budget Activity P-1 Line Item Nomenclature 
Aircraft Procurement, Navy/APN-3, Trainer Aircraft T-45TS MYP 
FY 1998 FY 1999 FY 2000 FY 2001 FY 2002 FY2003 FY2004 
Annual Procurement 
Proc Qty 15 15 15 15 4 0 
Gross Cost 210.1 211.9 212.6 209.3 67.1 
Less Adv Proc 3.1 5.0 5.2 5.1 1.7 
Net Proc (=P-1) 207.0 206.9 207.4 204.1 65.4 
Plus Adv Proc 3.1 5.0 5.2 5.1 1.7 0.0 
Contract Price 3.1 212.0 212.1 212.5 205.9 65.4 
Multiyear Proc 
Proc Qty 15 15 15 15 4 0 
Gross Cost (P-1) 199.2 200.9 201.5 198.4 63.6 
Less Adv Proc 3.1 37.4 53.7 39.8 7.0 
Net Proc 196.1 163.5 147.8 158.6 56.6 
AP for FY99 3.1 
AP for FYOO 37.4 
AP for FY01 12.5 41.2 
APfor FY02 7.3 21.6 10.9 
AP for FY03 0.0 0.0 4.0 3.0 0.0 
TotalAP 3.1 57.2 62.8 14.9 3.0 0.0 
Contract Price 3.1 253.2 226.3 162.8 161.6 56.6 
Multiyear Savings ($) 0.0 -41.2 -14.2 49.8 44.3 8.8 
Multiyear Savings (%) 
OUTLAYS 
Annual 0.6 39.0 99.4 166.3 191.5 173.4 130.3 
Multiyear 1.5 4.1 201.8 264.3 154.7 135.9 85.6 
Savings -0.9 34.9 -102.4 -98.0 36.8 37.5 44.7 
FY2005 FY2006 FY2007 FY2008 Total 





















66.3 27.7 13.2 3.2 910.9 
15.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 863.5 




APPENDIX E, EXHIBIT MYP-4, PRESENT VALUE ANALYSIS 
Exhibit MYP-4, Present Value Analysis Date January-98 
Appropriation/Budget Activity P-1 Line Item Nomenclature 
Aircraft Procurement, Navy/APN-3, Trainer Aircraft T-45TS MYP 
FY 1998 FY 1999 FY 2000 FY 2001 FY 2002 FY2003 FY2004 
Annual Proposal 
Then Year Cost 0.6 39.0 99.4 166.3 191.5 173.4 130.3 
Constant Year Cost 0.6 38.4 97.1 161.3 183.3 164.0 122.4 
Present Value 0.6 37.2 90.9 146.1 160.6 139.0 100.5 
Multiyear Proc 
Then Year Cost 1.5 4.1 201.8 264.3 154.7 135.9 85.6· 
Constant Year Cost 1.5 4.0 198.5 256.4 147.2 126.9 78.9 
Present Value 1.5 3.9 185.9 232.3 129.0 107.6 64.8 
Difference 
-
Then Year Cost -0.9 34.9 -102.4 -98.0 36.8 37.5 44.7 
Constant Year Cost -0.9 34.4 -101.4 -95.1 36.1 37.1 43.5 
Present Value -0.9 33.3 -95.0 -86.2 31.6 ·31.4 35.7 
-
Multiyear Savings ($) -0.9 34.9 -102.4 -98.0 36.8 37.5 44.7 
Multiyear Savings (%) 
Remarks 
Does not include plant shut down costs. 
FY2005 FY2006 FY2007 FY2008 Total 
. 
66.3 27.7 13.2 3.2 910.91 
61.9 25.8 12.3 3.0 870.1 
49.1 19.8 9.1 2.2 755.1 
15.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 863.5 
14.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 827.7 
11.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 736.3 
50.7 27.7 13.2 3.2 47.4 
47.6 25.8 12.3 3.0 42.4 
37.8 19.8 9.1 2.2 18.8 
50.7 27.7 13.2 3.2 47.4 
5.2% 
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